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Abstract
Browser fingerprinting is a relatively new method of uniquely identifying browsers
that can be used to track web users. Collectively unique and hence identifying pieces of
information, making up what is known as a fingerprint, can be collected from browsers
by a visited website, e.g. using JavaScript. Browser fingerprinting is increasingly being
used for online tracking of users even in the absence of a persistent IP address or cookie.
Since this represents a major threat to user privacy, it is therefore extremely important
to understand better how it works, how widely it is being used, and how its use can be
controlled. This observation motivates the work described in this thesis.
We automatically crawled the most visited 10,000 websites; this gave insights into
the number of websites that are potentially using fingerprinting, which websites are
collecting fingerprinting information, and exactly what information is being retrieved.
We found that approximately 69% of websites are, potentially, involved in first-party or
third-party browser fingerprinting.
We examined the fingerprintable attributes made available by a range of modern
browsers. We tested the most widely used browsers for both desktop and mobile
platforms. The results reveal significant differences between browsers in terms of their
fingerprinting potential, meaning that the choice of browser has significant privacy
implications.
The recently-introduced WebRTC API enables client IP addresses to become avail-
able to a visited website via JavaScript, even if a VPN is in use. We performed
experiments with the five most widely used WebRTC-enabled browsers and five widely
used commercial VPN services to investigate this further. Our experiments revealed
that the number and type of leaked IP addresses are affected by the choice of browser
as well as the VPN service and program settings.
We describe FingerprintAlert, a freely available browser extension we developed
that detects and, optionally, blocks fingerprinting attempts by visited websites. It also
provides users with a log of detected fingerprinting attempts including what information
was collected and by whom.
Our investigations confirm previous findings that third-party fingerprinting coun-
termeasures have inherit limitations and many browser vendors do not appear to have
made significant efforts to control browser fingerprinting. To help provide a better
understanding of the problem, we provide a comprehensive and structured discussion
of measures to limit or control browser fingerprinting, covering both user-based and
browser-based techniques. Further, a somewhat counterintuitive possible new browser
identifier is proposed which could make cookies and fingerprint-based tracking redundant;
the need for, and possible effect of, this feature is discussed.
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1.1 Context of Research
A number of authors have discussed the very wide variety of readily available attributes
collectable by websites from a visiting browser. Because the set of retrievable attributes
is in most cases unique per browser instance, this enables websites to uniquely identify
browsers; this is known as browser fingerprinting [1, 18, 52, 61]. The main reason
browser fingerprinting has attracted so much attention is that it enables tracking of
user platforms, i.e. linking of multiple visits by a single browser instance to the same or
multiple websites.
Because of its potential use for tracking, browser fingerprinting is becoming an
increasingly serious privacy concern despite some apparently benign applications. Its
virtually permanent nature is something that might be subject to future regulation,
much as the use of cookies has recently received the attention of regulators in Europe
[21]. Several studies (e.g. [47, 57, 86]) have suggested that browser fingerprinting has
been used to track users by re-spawning tracking cookies and, as a result, limit the degree
to which user cookie deletion protects user privacy. Fingerprinting is also potentially
being used as an alternative to cookie tracking. It is interesting to note that the use of
browser fingerprinting by websites is to some extent regulated by the European Union’s
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [14] that was adopted in 20161. However,
browser fingerprinting remains widely used and appear to be largely uncontrolled.
Browser fingerprinting use is virtually invisible to users and there is no direct way
of preventing it. Moreover, we found that the four browsers used by more than 88% of
web users (i.e. Chrome, Internet Explorer, Firefox and Edge) do almost nothing to help
1Given that browser fingerprinting involves collecting user-related data as well as potentially tracking
users, GDPR would appear to require websites to both announce and justify its use [78].
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mitigate fingerprinting2, alert the user to its occurrence, or even provide information
about it in user help documents.
This chapter provides an overview of the thesis, and is organized as follows. In
Section 1.2 we discuss the motivation for the research described in this thesis. Section
1.3 outlines the major contributions. The role of co-authors in the work described in
this thesis is clarified in Section 1.4. A list of relevant ublications is presented in Section
1.5, and Section 1.6 concludes the chapter with a brief outline of the thesis.
1.2 Motivation
The thesis attempts to answer the following question. To what extent does real world
browser fingerprinting affect user privacy?
As noted above, in recent years browser fingerprinting has been widely discussed
not least because of its potential use for user tracking. This is a fast-moving area, and
hence findings from only a few years ago may no longer give a true picture of its current
effectiveness and prevalence. In particular, modern browsers are constantly adding new
features with the introduction of new APIs such as Canvas, WebGL, and WebRTC.
These new additions have an unintended effect of increasing the fingerprinting surface
of browsers [17, 66]. Indeed, the range of attributes retrievable from browsers, as well
as methods for retrieving them, have been widely discussed. However, relatively little
has been published regarding the real-world prevalence of browser fingerprinting, who
is deploying it, the types of attributes collected to achieve it and how to control it.
In addition, no previous author has compared how browsers differ in terms of their
susceptibility to fingerprinting.
Because of the serious privacy concerns arising from fingerprinting-enabled tracking,
these issues clearly merit further investigation, and this observation has motivated the
work described in this thesis.
1.3 Contributions
In this thesis, we performed a number of studies to learn more about the nature and
prevalence of browser fingerprinting. In the first of these we attempted to gain a better
understanding of the degree to which widely visited websites are performing or enabling
browser fingerprinting.
• We assembled a script that crawled the 10,000 most widely visited websites to
detect the unprompted collection of information that could be used for fingerprint-
2Firefox has a limited set of options to reduce the effectiveness of fingerprinting.
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ing. We were able to identify websites that collect such information as well as the
types of information they collected. Whilst we are not the first to perform such a
study, we used a novel method of identifying possible browser fingerprinting that
provides an upper bound on the number of sites that perform it.
In our second group of contributions, we examine specific aspects of fingerprinting
techniques, with the goal of understanding their effectiveness. As part of this work,
we were the first to demonstrate that browsers vary in their susceptibility to browser
fingerprinting. In related work, we also examined one of the techniques that could be
used to compromise user privacy through the exploitation of a feature in the WebRTC
API. This API can be used to learn a client’s private IP address(es) even if the client
is connected via an anonymizing VPN. We examined the extent to which this privacy
vulnerability can be exploited in widely used browsers and VPN clients.
• The most widely used browsers were tested and shown to vary in the amount of
information useful for fingerprinting that can be retrieved. This means that some
browsers are more likely to enable an instance to be uniquely identified.
• We conducted a study to determine whether a recently proposed means of learning
private client IP addresses via the WebRTC API works in practice; in particular,
we focussed on the case where the client is using a VPN, often with the specific
goal of enhancing privacy. In this study we examined every combination of five
widely used browsers and five widely used VPN clients, in each case enumerating
which IP addresses could be obtained.
Whilst the first chapters of the thesis are directed at understanding the prevalence
and effectiveness of browser fingerprinting methods, the rest of the thesis is aimed at
trying to improve the current situation, by giving users greater control over fingerprinting.
We describe the design and implementation of a browser extension that alerts users to
browser fingerprinting attempts, and gives them the option to block them. Furthermore,
we analyze all previously discussed fingerprinting countermeasures, and use this analysis
to formulate a set of recommendations that could help control browser fingerprinting.
Finally, we propose a novel type of browser identifier with the goal of obviating the
need for browser fingerprinting, which could help bring to an end its current widespread
and uncontrolled use.
• A detailed description is given of a novel browser extension. The extension helps
users be aware of fingerprinting attempts by websites they visit. Moreover, it can
also help to reduce the effectiveness of browser fingerprinting.
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• We provide comprehensive guidance on how browser fingerprinting can be con-
trolled, especially by browser vendors. We also propose a new type of browser
identifier that could provide a standardized alternative to browser fingerprinting.
The identifiers would enable online tracking but, unlike fingerprinting, would be
transparent and user controllable.
1.4 Joint Work
With the following exceptions, all relating to software development, I have performed all
the research described in this thesis, under the supervision of Professor Chris Mitchell.
• The coding for the crawler software used to perform the experiments described in
Chapter 3 was mainly performed by Dr Wanpeng Li, although decisions about
functionality were primarily under my control.
• The scripts that support the Fingerprintability website, discussed in Chapters 4
and 5, were jointly developed with Dr Wanpeng Li.
• Coding for the FingerprintAlert browser extension, described in Chapter 6, was
mainly performed by Dr Wanpeng Li, although user interface design and decisions
about functionality were primarily under my control.
1.5 Publications
Publications containing some of the research results described in this thesis are listed
below.
• N. M. Al-Fannah and W. Li. Not all browsers are created equal: Comparing
web browser fingerprintability. In S. Obana and K. Chida, editors, Advances in
Information and Computer Security — 12th International Workshop on Security,
IWSEC 2017, Hiroshima, Japan, August 30 – September 1, 2017, Proceedings,
volume 10418 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 105–120. Springer,
2017. [Winner of best student paper.]
• N. M. Al-Fannah. One leak will sink a ship: WebRTC IP address leaks. In
International Carnahan Conference on Security Technology, ICCST 2017, Madrid,
Spain, October 23–26, 2017, pages 1–5. IEEE, 2017.
• N. M. Al-Fannah, W. Li, and C. J. Mitchell. Beyond cookie monster amnesia: Real
world persistent online tracking. In L. Chen, M. Manulis, and S. Schneider, editors,
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Information Security — 21st International Conference, ISC 2018, Guildford, UK,
September 9–12, 2018, Proceedings, volume 11060 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pages 481–501. Springer, 2018.
1.6 Thesis Outline
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows.
• Chapter 2 gives the background material necessary for the remainder of the
thesis. It describes the various aspects of the browser fingerprinting ecosystem
that are necessary to understand the rest of the thesis.
• Chapter 3 is concerned with gaining a better understanding of the current
prevalence of browser fingerprinting as well as the extent of its tracking capabilities.
It first examines previous work aimed at determining the prevalence of browser
fingerprinting in the Web. Then it describes a study we conducted to identify the
possible conduct of browser fingerprinting by the top 10,000 websites.
• Chapter 4 reviews the differences between widely used browsers in terms of their
susceptibility to browser fingerprinting. The tests were performed on a range of
browsers and operating systems (both desktop and mobile).
• Chapter 5 describes the results of a study on the leakage of client IP address(es)
even when using an anonymizing VPN. This leak of IP addresses can be very
useful for browser fingerprinting, and is also a major privacy threat in that in
some cases it can reveal a user’s geographic locality. We examined the presence of
this problem in a range of widely used VPN clients and browsers.
• Chapter 6 describes a novel anti-fingerprinting browser extension, Fingerprint-
Alert. It details the operation of the FingerprintAlert extension which was used
in the study described in Chapter 3 and is also of value in its own right.
• Chapter 7 considers the degree to which browser fingerprinting can be con-
trolled by examining all previously proposed countermeasures, and assessing their
real-world effectiveness. This leads to a set of recommendations for browser
fingerprinting control, as well as a proposal for the use of a standardized browser
identifier to help make browser fingerprinting unnecessary.
• Chapter 8 concludes the thesis by summarizing the main contributions as well





In this chapter we provide background information that is necessary to understand the
rest of thesis. We are concerned throughout this thesis with HTTP interactions between
a browser running on a user platform, e.g. a phone or PC (the client), and a remote
(web) server. Browser fingerprinting relies on the server gaining information about
the client platform via HTTP, including via executable code (typically in JavaScript)
downloaded to the client as part of an HTTP exchange and subsequently executed on
that client. Downloaded JavaScript code is typically able to access a wide range of
internal browser APIs1 completely transparently to the user, and these APIs can reveal
a range of information about the client which can be reported back to the web server,
again completely transparently to the user.
Client-server interactions supporting browser fingerprinting may also include the
involvement of third-party web servers, to which the client will send HTTP requests as
a result of links included in the HTTP message sent to the client. We do not go into
the technical details of HTTP and JavaScript here — the interested reader is referred
to one of the many textbooks on the subject, e.g. Crockford [15] or Gorley and Totty
[30], as well as RFC 7231 [25].
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides an
overview of browser fingerprinting. Some key techniques commonly used for browser
fingerprinting are described in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 provides an overview of online
tracking. We discuss privacy concerns related to browser fingerprinting in Section 2.5.
The summary in Section 2.6 concludes the chapter.
1A web API, i.e. a web Application Programming Interface, is a set of functions or methods that
can be used to access certain functionality of web browsers.
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2.2 Browser Fingerprinting
2.2.1 Fundamentals
Browser fingerprinting is a technique that can be used by a web server to uniquely
identify a platform; it involves using information provided by the browser, e.g. website-
originated JavaScript, to assemble a platform-specific fingerprint. The differences in
web browser instances were first discussed 10 years ago by Mayer [51], albeit in a very
limited way. A year later, Mayer’s work was followed by the seminal work of Eckersley
[18]. Eckersley coined the term browser fingerprinting and performed a detailed study,
including a number of important experiments. Since then, the range and richness of
fingerprinting information retrievable from a browser has substantially increased [44]. Of
course, cookies2 and/or the client IP address can also be used for platform identification,
but browser fingerprinting is designed to enable identification even if cookies are not
available and the IP address is obfuscated, e.g. through the use of anonymizing proxies.
Back in 2010, Eckersley [18] described how the collection of a range of apparently
trivial and readily-available browser attributes, such as time zone, screen resolution,
set of installed plugins, and operating system version, could be combined to uniquely
identify a browser instance; this is the process he dubbed browser fingerprinting. Since
then, many other authors, including Mowery and Shacham [56], Mowery et al. [55],
Boda et al. [10], Olejnik et al. [63], Fifield and Egelman [26] and Mulazzani et al. [57],
have described a range of ways of enhancing its effectiveness. In parallel, and motivated
by the threat to user privacy posed by browser fingerprinting, a number of authors, e.g.
Nikiforakis et al. [60], Fiore et al. [27] and FaizKhademi et al. [22] have proposed ways
of limiting its effectiveness.
The BrowserLeaks website3 (https://www.browserleaks.com) and Alaca and Van
Oorschot [6] catalogue a wide range of types of information that could be used for
browser fingerprinting. Pathilake et al. [83] have also classified some of the most widely
used methods for fingerprinting. As discussed in 2.2.2, browser fingerprinting is clearly
very effective.
Browser fingerprinting enables user web activity to be tracked. It relies on learning
properties of a browser and its host platform, including both hardware properties and
software state (cf. the term device fingerprinting [28]). Browser fingerprinting typically
2A web cookie is a small amount of data sent by a website as part of an HTTP response and then
stored by the browser. The browser then provides the contents of the cookie back to the same server in
subsequent HTTP requests [7].
3This website is the most comprehensive source for fingerprintable attributes we were able to find on
the web. It uses a variety of scripts to display retrievable fingerprintable attributes. Most fingerprintable
attributes discussed in the literature can be found on the website as well as many that are not.
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involves a web server performing some combination of: (a) collecting and analyzing
information contained in HTTP request headers, and (b) downloading JavaScript to
the browser which collects and sends back information gathered from browser APIs.
Examples of collected information include: screen resolution, CPU/GPU model, and
names of installed fonts4. As in these examples, collectable attributes relate to both
browser and host platform. Some attributes change over time (e.g. browser version)
but uniquely identifying a browser instance is usually still possible [86], and uniquely
identifying the hosting platform may still be possible even if a different browser is used
[12].
2.2.2 Effectiveness
Browser fingerprinting is clearly very effective; for example, in a large-scale study,
Laperdrix et al. [44] observed that an average of 86% of desktop and mobile browsers
possess a unique fingerprint; other studies [18, 55] have reported similar results (80–90%).
It is important to note that some of the attributes that can be used for fingerprinting
vary between desktop and mobile platforms; as a result the efficiency of fingerprinting
also varies between platform types [44]. For example, a device model name can be
retrieved from a mobile browser’s user agent HTTP header field but not from its desktop
counterpart. This is an issue examined in detail in Chapter 4.
2.2.3 Applications
Apart from client tracking, discussed in Section 2.4, four widely discussed uses of browser
fingerprinting are: targeted advertising [2, 45]; social media sharing [45, 68]; analytics
services [2, 45]; and web security [2, 82]. Browser fingerprinting also has other potential
uses, e.g. to act as a second layer of authentication [18]. However, even in these cases
the server gets the benefit, and the user is often not informed that fingerprinting is in
use [90]. Determining the exact reason(s) why a website deploys browser fingerprinting
is extremely difficult.
2.2.4 Third-Party Fingerprinting
Browser fingerprinting websites perform it either as a first-party or a third-party (or
both). That is, a website may download a piece JavaScript code to the browser, which
can send the collected attributes back to either its own site (first-party fingerprinting)
or to a third-party site (third-party fingerprinting) [70]. It is even possible that some
4A demonstration of the wide range of information collectable from any browser is available at
https://fingerprintable.org/test.
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website operators are not aware that a third-party is performing browser fingerprinting
via their website [20]. This could arise because third-party fingerprinting sites typically
provide client websites with the JavaScript code which collects and sends back to
the third-party site the attributes used for fingerprinting; in return for serving this
JavaScript, the third-party site provides a range of services to the client website (e.g.
data analytics or social plugins). As a result, some website operators may not know
what data the third-party JavaScript script collects from user browsers, or what it might
be used for.
In the context of tracking, first-party fingerprinting gives relatively little information
to a website — it merely enables multiple visits by the same browser to be linked,
and gives no information about other visited websites. If the user identity is known
by other means (e.g. because the user logs in) it can also indicate when this user is
employing multiple devices [2]. Third-party fingerprinting, on the other hand, is much
more privacy-damaging in that it enables browsers (and hence users) to be tracked
across multiple websites. In Chapter 3 we report on the websites that perform the
majority of third-party tracking.
2.3 Browser Fingerprinting Techniques
As first noted by Eckersley [18], one fundamental source of client information that can
be used to help fingerprinting is the user agent field of an HTTP request header [25]. It
gives information related to the browser, including its type and version. This field can
be used to enable a website to tailor content to meet the needs of differing browsing
platforms [25]. An example of the contents of this field as generated by the Mozilla
Firefox browser running on a Windows 10 PC is given in Figure 2.1. The various
components of the example user agent5 are explained in Table 2.1.
Figure 2.1: A sample user agent string
More generally, browser fingerprinting can be performed by either active or passive
means [17]. Passive fingerprinting depends entirely on information retrievable through
regular HTTP requests, such as the user agent field discussed above, whereas active
fingerprinting involves the use of scripts to retrieve further information about the
browser and its configuration. Active fingerprinting enables websites to collect far
5The components are explained following to Mozilla developer’s website https://developer.mozilla.
org/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/User-Agent/Firefox [accessed on 16/05/2019]
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Table 2.1: Explanation of the various components of a sample user agent string
Component Meaning
Mozilla/5.0 Compatible with the last version of the legacy Mozilla browser*
Windows NT 10.0 Operating system is Windows 10
Win64 64-bit browser running on Windows
x64 64-bit operating system
rv:66.0 Rendering engine version
Gecko Rendering engine
20100101 Build date 01/01/2010*
Firefox/66.0 Browser name and version
*Obsolete fields.
more information than is collectable via passive fingerprinting, and thus makes browser
fingerprinting much more effective [6]. However, while active fingerprinting is in principle
detectable through analysis of downloaded JavaScript, information useable for passive
fingerprinting is automatically received by websites (i.e. without prompting) and that
makes it virtually undetectable.
We next provide more details about the types of information that can be used for
both passive and active fingerprinting.
2.3.1 Passive Fingerprinting
As noted above, passive fingerprinting uses attributes that are part of routine communi-
cations between a client (i.e. browser) and a server (i.e. website). In particular it does
not involve any active probing of the client’s browser such as the use of JavaScript.
Examples of attributes that can be gathered in this passive way include the following.
• Clock skew involves identifying the deviation of a client’s clock, in milliseconds,
from the true time [40]. Clock skew for a client device can be estimated by
gathering and processing a number of TCP timestamps.
• As discussed above, the user agent [25] HTTP header string provides web servers
with information related to the client’s browser and hosting platform. This string
is sent by a client browser to the web server of a visited website as part of a client
HTTP request for web resources. As has been widely discussed [18, 29, 88], this
string is a rich source of discriminating information for fingerprinting. According
to RFC 7231 [25], the user agent should be included in all HTTP request headers
but it is not mandatory. A browser can be configured by a user to exclude the
user agent string from its HTTP request headers. The user agent string can also
be retrieved if a website used JavaScript to probe the browser. Hence, the user
10
2.3. Browser Fingerprinting Techniques 2. Background
agent can also be part of active fingerprinting (see 2.3.2).
• The IP address of a client can be used for browser fingerprinting [18]. Typically, a
client device possess at least two IP addresses, one public and another private/local.
However, only the public IP address is readily known by visited websites. The
usefulness of an IP address for fingerprinting varies depending on the client network
setup. For example, a dedicated static client IP address is significantly more
distinguishing than a dynamically assigned client IP address that is potentially
shared by other clients. IP addresses can also be retrieved via active fingerprinting
using the WebRTC API (see 2.3.2).
2.3.2 Active Fingerprinting
This involves the execution of attribute-gathering scripts within the client browser. The
number of possible attributes of this type that have been discussed in the literature is
far larger than the number of passive fingerprinting attributes. Some key examples of
attributes of this type are as follows.
• Canvas fingerprinting is a widely discussed and highly effective browser finger-
printing technique [56]. The Canvas API is a recently widely-deployed HTML5
API that allows websites to render an image for display by the user browser, a
bandwidth-efficient alternative to downloading an image file from the server [87].
A number of authors [1, 44, 56] have demonstrated the possibility of uniquely
fingerprinting browsers and their host platforms based on subtle differences in
how an image is rendered by the browser.
This method works because the Canvas API allows a visited website to request the
return of the RGBA6 values of a canvas-rendered image pixels7 [56]. The details
of this image will vary depending on the platform and the browser, meaning that
the details of the rendered image can be used as a fingerprinting attribute. For
convenience, the image data set can be input to a hash function and the output of
this used as the Canvas attribute. This technique is known a canvas fingerprinting.
• WebRTC [9] is a set of APIs and communications protocols that provides browsers
and mobile applications with Real-Time Communications (RTC) capabilities. This
set of APIs can be used in a variety of ways to obtain information useful for
browser fingerprinting.
6Red, Green, Blue and Alpha (i.e. opacity).
7The canvas.toDataURL() function is used to achieve this.
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For example, identifying one or more of the client IP addresses via a feature of
WebRTC was first reported and demonstrated by Roesler8 in 2015. The disclosure
of client private IP address(es) in this way is informally known as a WebRTC
Leak. The IP address(es) revealed through a WebRTC leak could include the
client’s local IPv4 address as well as one or more of the client’s unique local
addresses (ULAs)9. As discussed by a number of authors (e.g. Hosoi et al. [35],
Jakobsson [37] and Sandholm et al. [72]), a WebRTC-enabled browser uses the
Interactive Connectivity Establishment (ICE) [38] Protocol to establish a P2P
connection. This protocol enables it to retrieve both public and local IP addresses
to establish a connection. To acquire the IP addresses, the ICE protocol utilizes a
STUN (Session Traversal Utilities for NAT) [71] server, and if that fails, it relays
the connection through a TURN (Traversal Using Relay NAT) [50] server. A
tracking website could use STUN/TURN servers to trick a browser into revealing
IP addresses that are otherwise invisible to websites.
A different means of using WebRTC for browser fingerprinting arises from the
fact that apparently unique IDs are assigned to certain types of hardware device
within a client platform. These IDs vary in length and persistence depending on
the browser (see Chapter 4) and can potentially be used for fingerprinting since
they are made available to executing JavaScript by the WebRTC API.
• The set of installed fonts on a device can be used as a fingerprinting attribute,
as this set appears to vary widely across devices, [2, 18]. Using this information
for browser fingerprinting was first described by Eckersley [18] in 2010, who found
it to be one of the most useful techniques from amongst those he examined. The
method originally discussed for retrieving this information was through probing
a Flash-enabled browser for the list of installed fonts. This method for learning
the set of installed fonts is more effective for browser fingerprinting purposes than
other techniques because Flash provides the font list sorted in the installation
order, where this ordering is itself of value for fingerprinting. The enumeration of
fonts through Flash is typically achieved by including a Flash object on a website
that allows the retrieval of font information. However, since 2010, this method
of retrieving font information is no longer very effective, since Flash is no longer
widely used (indeed, many browsers do not allow its use). However, despite this,
the set of installed fonts is still a very valuable fingerprinting attribute as this
8The report and the demonstration script can be found at https://github.com/diafygi/
webrtc-ips [accessed on 24/05/2017]
9The ULA is the approximate IPv6 counterpart of the IPv4 local address; see https://tools.ietf.
org/html/rfc4193 [accessed on 03/03/2017]
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information can be obtained in a number of other ways. For example, the font
list can be obtained using JavaScript and Cascading Style Sheets (CSS)10, as well
as via the Canvas API as reported by Englehardt and Narayanan [20].
• The WebGL API [36] is used to render graphics within a browser. As part
of its functionality it reveals various host attributes (e.g. render buffer size and
GPU/CPU model) of the hardware that hosts the browser [6, 44, 56]. In Appendix
C.1 we provide a list of WebGL attributes that were collected by websites that
were surveyed in the experiment described in Chapter 3.
Some browsers provide access to the identity of the vendor and the specific model
of the user platform’s CPU or GPU. These two pieces of information are obtained
by requesting the following WebGL attributes: UNMASKED VENDOR WEBGL and
UNMASKED RENDERER WEBGL. These attributes could reveal the Central Processing
Unit (CPU) type if there is no GPU or if the GPU is not used by the browser.
• Although the user agent is typically received by a web server at first point of
contact, it can also be actively retrieved via the JavaScript navigator.userAgent
property. This potentially allows any third-party script to retrieve a browser’s
user agent string even though it does not receive the initial HTTP request header
from the browser (it is only received by the first-party web server [25]). Moreover,
as reported by Nikiforakis et al. [61], some privacy browser extensions spoof the
user agent string in the HTTP request header but not in the browser itself and so
actively probing a browser for the user agent could reveal the real string.
2.4 Online Tracking
Online tracking (or web tracking) is the process of monitoring a user’s online activities;
entities that perform tracking are known as trackers [45]. It is virtually impossible to
determine if a website is actually tracking users; one can simply observe whether a
website collects attributes from browsers that would allow it to track a client via browser
fingerprinting. In line with common usage, we refer to recipients of fingerprintable data
(whether first- or third-party) as trackers or fingerprinters.
In practice, the most common motive for online tracking is to enable online be-
havioural advertising. This describes the practice by web advertising companies of
tracking users’ online activities in order to display personalised and targeted advertise-
ments [84]. Additionally, tracking is used as a tool for market research [52]. There are
10As reported by Takei et al. [79], installed fonts can be detected through CSS even when JavaScript
is disabled on a client’s browser.
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two main approaches to online tracking — stateful tracking involving the use of cookies
[52], and stateless tracking, including the use of browser fingerprinting as defined in
Section 2.2. In this thesis, we focus on the latter.
Tracking web users has long been possible by using cookies. However, the absence of
a cookie (e.g. because it has been deleted by the user) means that the device is unlikely
to continue to be tracked [18]. By contrast, browser fingerprinting requires no files to be
stored on the user’s device, its effectiveness partly depends on the browser, and users
have virtually no control over it. It can be used for tracking web users by creating a
unique ID derived by combining collected attributes [44].
That is, browser fingerprinting is in some ways a more reliable method of tracking
than the use of cookies [47], and it appears that browser fingerprinting is increasingly
being used for this purpose. Unlike browser fingerprinting, cookies are stored on user
devices and so can be controlled or deleted by users. In particular, the use of a private
browsing mode11, as provided by many browsers, whilst limiting the use of cookies does
very little to protect users against browser fingerprinting (as discussed in Chapter 4).
Furthermore, while modern browsers provide a user-selectable Do Not Track option,
this apparently does not prevent widespread tracking [2].
2.5 Browser Fingerprinting Privacy Concerns
As noted above, concern has been expressed about the threat to user privacy posed
by browser fingerprinting. Since Eckersley first described it, the range and richness of
information retrievable from a browser that is usable for fingerprinting has substantially
increased, as has real-world deployment of fingerprinting by websites (see Chapter 3).
As has been widely discussed, for example by Eckersley [18], Narayanan and Reisman
[58], and Perry [65], there are a number of reasons why browser fingerprinting represents
a more significant threat to user privacy than cookies.
• Typically there is no simple way to determine for certain whether a website is
deploying any of the various browser fingerprinting techniques.
• A user can limit the tracking power of cookies in a number of ways, e.g. by regularly
deleting cookies or blocking them altogether (as supported by most browsers),
but there are no comparable, easily configured, means of limiting fingerprinting.
• Unlike cookies, browser fingerprinting is not dependent on a single explicit feature
of HTTP. Fingerprinting rather relies on many techniques to collect various
11Modes of this type, which have various names, are intended to enhance the privacy properties of
the browser [89].
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information about the properties and configuration of the browser and its host
platform. Any of this information has the potential to be used for fingerprinting.
2.6 Summary
Browser fingerprinting is a relatively new method of uniquely identifying browser
instances that can be used to track web users. A range of individual pieces of information
(attributes) about a platform can be collected from a browser by a visited website,
e.g. using downloaded JavaScript; whilst typically not individually unique, the set of
attributes make up what is known as a fingerprint, and this fingerprint can typically
be used to uniquely identify a platform. In some ways browser fingerprinting is more
privacy-threatening than tracking via cookies, as users have no direct control over it. It
is increasingly being used for online tracking of users even in the absence of a persistent





The work described in this chapter and Chapter 6, is largely based on [5]. In this chapter
we review previous work looking at this issue and we report on a survey we undertook
to discover the current situation. In this rapidly evolving area, repeated surveys are
vitally important and, as we discuss in this chapter, it appears that fingerprinting has
become much more common since previous studies were performed.
A number of authors (e.g. Eckersley [18], Acar et al. [1], Mayer and Mitchell [52]
and Nikiforakis et al. [61]) have examined the range of attributes that could be used
for browser fingerprinting — a summary of some of these attribute types was given in
the previous chapter. Although the range of retrievable attributes, as well as methods
for retrieving them, have been widely discussed, relatively little has been published
regarding the real-world prevalence of browser fingerprinting, who is deploying it, and the
types of attributes collected to achieve it. This issue clearly merits further investigation,
and has motivated the work described in the next chapter.
In this chapter we also describe the results of a study of the fingerprinting behaviour
of the 10,000 most visited websites. We aimed to discover how many websites deploy
active browser fingerprinting, whether directly or through third parties. We also
examined and, where possible, identified the attributes that were collected by the sites
that were identified as performing browser fingerprinting. One important motive for
understanding better the prevalence and nature of browser fingerprinting is to help in
developing tools that inform the user about fingerprinting, and also enable users to
exert control over the degree to which fingerprinting is possible. To this latter end, in
Chapter 6 we describe FingerprintAlert, a browser extension developed as part of the
study, which makes users aware whenever a website is collecting information usable for
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browser fingerprinting. It also allows all detected fingerprinting to be blocked.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews relevant
prior art, and in Section 3.3 we briefly discuss the limitations of this previous work. In
Section 3.4 we discuss the main motivations for the study described in this chapter. In
Section 3.5 the procedure we used to collect data from 10,000 websites is described;
the results obtained are reported in Section 3.7 and are analyzed in Section 3.8. In
Section 3.9 we discuss the relationship of our study to the prior art. We summarize the
chapter in Section 3.10.
3.2 Previous Work
The following list summarizes (in chronological order) all the previous work which in
some way has examined the prevalence of browser fingerprinting. A summary of the
findings of these previous studies is given in Table 3.1. As discussed below, many of
these papers give only a very limited examination of real-world browser fingerprinting,
e.g. by focussing on a single fingerprinting technique.
• In 2013, Nikiforakis et al. [61] attempted to discover the prevalence of browser
fingerprinting the top 10,000 websites. This is the first study of this type. They
crawled up to 20 pages of each website, searching for specific fingerprinting
scripts supplied by three major third-party fingerprinters. The chosen scripts
recovered information useful for several browser fingerprinting techniques, including
font detection through JavaScript and Flash; and user agent detection through
JavaScript and HTTP. The study revealed that fingerprinting is being performed
by only 0.4% of the tested websites.
• In 2013, Acar et al. [2] crawled the top one million websites to identify the
deployment of a single fingerprinting technique, namely determining the set of
installed fonts. They found that 0.04% of tested websites deployed this technique.
This was the first study to examine use of the Canvas API for fingerprinting. It
was also the first fingerprinting study to examine as many as one million websites
and it remains amongst the largest studies of the prevalence of fingerprinting in
terms of the number of tested websites.
• In 2014, Acar et al. [1] examined the top 100,000 websites for the presence of
three tracking techniques, including a fingerprinting tracking technique using the
Canvas API. They found that 5% of the tested websites used this technique.
The fingerprinting technique considered in this study differs from the technique
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examined in the 2013 Acar et al. study [2] in that it involves canvas-rendered
images rather than canvas-rendered fonts.
• In 2015, FaizKhademi et al. [22] described FPGuard, a browser extension they
developed that resists fingerprinting. The extension detects various fingerprinting
scripts that are indicative of four fingerprinting techniques, namely JavaScript
Objects Fingerprinting, JavaScript-based Font Detection, Flash-based Fingerprint-
ing, and Canvas Fingerprinting. The study found that the first three of these
techniques are used by the two major fingerprinting providers they examined. The
authors used the FPGuard extension on the top 10,000 websites and found that
42.6% of the tested websites appeared to perform fingerprinting.
• In 2015, Libert [47] examined the top one million websites for the presence of
third-party JavaScript. He used this as an indication of the possible presence
of fingerprinting scripts. He found that 83% of the tested websites contained
third-party scripts. Libert argued that this might still be a slight underestimate
of the real percentage for a number of reasons, including that a small number
of websites could be using non-JavaScript scripts/plugins (e.g. Adobe Flash or
Microsoft Silverlight).
• In 2016, Engelhardt and Narayanan [20] reported on a study involving crawling
the one million most visited websites for the possible deployment of 15 tracking
techniques including five widely discussed fingerprinting techniques, namely: use
of the Canvas API, detecting the set of installed fonts using the Canvas API, calls
to WebRTC, use of AudioContext, and detection of battery charge level using the
Battery API. They found a very low rate of use of the last two techniques. On
the other hand, they found that Canvas API fingerprinting, font set detection
via the Canvas API, and WebRTC-based fingerprinting were being performed by
1.4%, 0.3% and 0.07%, respectively, of the tested websites.
• In 2017, Olejnik et al. [64] crawled the top 50,000 websites to identify the possible
use of the battery API for fingerprinting purposes. They found that 1.7% of the
tested websites served scripts that accessed this API. This study was the first
to examine the use of the battery API for fingerprinting purposes. However, as
discussed in 7.4.3, many browsers no longer support this API.
• In 2017, Haga et al. [32] reported on a study which found that 17.3% of the top
100,000 websites were using at least one fingerprinting script. They reached this
result by attempting to detect the presence of various known fingerprinting scripts
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on the tested websites. They concluded that 50% of the identified suspected
fingerprinting is associated with google-analytics.
• In 2018, Das et al. [16] checked whether websites attempted to access motion
sensors, which they suggested are mostly used for fingerprinting purposes. They
found that 3.7% of the top 100,000 websites attempted to retrieve information
through such sensors from visitor devices. It is worth noting that the technique
examined in this study can only be used to fingerprint mobile devices. They also
found that of the devices which did attempt to retrieve motion sensor data, 63%
also gathered other data likely to be useful for fingerprinting purposes.
Table 3.1: Prevalence of fingerprinting according to previous studies
Year Study Detection Method Websites Fingerprinters%
2013 Nikiforakis et al. [61] limited scripts 10K 0.4%
2013 Acar et al. [2] canvas font 1M 0.04%
2014 Acar et al. [1] canvas 100K 5%
2015 FaizKhademi et al. [22] various scripts 10K 42.6%
2015 Libert [47] 3rd-party scripts 1M 83%






2017 Olejnik et al. [64] battery 50K 1.7%
2017 Haga et al. [32] various scripts 100K 17.3%
2018 Das et al. [16] motion sensors 100K 3.7%
3.3 Analysis
As many authors have reported, there are a large number of techniques that could
be used for browser fingerprinting. For example, in 2016 Alaca and van Oorschot [6]
described 29 different such techniques, and more than 50 methods are demonstrated
on the BrowserLeaks website. Moreover, this is a rapidly evolving area, where new
techniques are constantly being devised and at the same time other techniques are
becoming less effective (e.g. those based on the use of Flash). Thus studies such as those
of Acar et al. [2], Acar et al. [1], Englehardt and Narayanan [20] and Olejnik et al. [64],
which attempt to detect browser fingerprinting by checking for the use of a small number
of fingerprinting techniques, risk seriously underestimating the actual prevalence. It
is also interesting to note that all these studies identified possible fingerprinting by
examining the downloaded scripts, rather than by looking at the behaviour of these
scripts. Interestingly, these studies were the first to identify possible fingerprinting using
the Battery and Canvas APIs.
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An alternative approach to detecting browser fingerprinting is to detect the presence
of certain scripts known to be widely used for the purpose. This is the approach followed
by Nikiforakis et al. [61], FaizKhademi et al. [22] and Haga et al. [32]. However, this
approach again risks underestimating the actual prevalence, given that the set of scripts
is constantly evolving. However, detecting only known fingerprinting scripts has the
advantage of not giving any false positives, i.e. providing a lower bound on the level of
fingerprinting.
The study of Libert [47] is likely to overestimate the presence of fingerprinting since
it is based on the presence of any third-party scripts on an examined website. Of
course, this approach is still valuable as it provides an approximate upper-bound on the
proportion of websites performing active fingerprinting.
Finally, Das et al. [16] report on a study performed after that described in Chapter 4,
which looked only at fingerprinting that involved the use of mobile phone sensors. This
was the first study to examine the real-world use of mobile phone motion sensors for
fingerprinting. Unsurprisingly, the study found that only a relatively small proportion
of websites were fingerprinting using this approach.
3.4 Motivation
Despite the fact that browser fingerprinting techniques have been extensively studied, as
noted above, relatively limited information is available on its prevalence and the browser
attributes that are collected in practice. To the author’s knowledge, no study prior to
that described in Chapter 4 has attempted to discover all the browser fingerprinting
attributes that are collected by a large set of real-world websites. Moreover, all previous
studies except Libert [47] identified fingerprinting by the presence of certain scripts.
Fingerprinting using any other scripts would therefore have been missed.
These observations motivate the work described in the next chapter, in which we
report on a study of the fingerprinting behaviour of the 10,000 most popular websites.
Determining which attributes are being used for browser fingerprinting (regardless of
scripts deployed) is a key step in trying to understand how best to control it, a key goal
of this thesis.
3.5 Data Collection Methodology
3.5.1 Data Gathering
The main objectives of the data collection exercise were to assess the number of websites
performing browser fingerprinting, and discover what types of data are being collected
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for this purpose. To achieve our objectives, we decided to crawl a large number of
well-used websites and to test their data gathering behaviour. We chose 10,000 sites
as this seemed both sufficiently many to generate representative results, and also a
manageable number so we could analyze the considerable volumes of data generated.
Unlike the work others including Englehardt and Narayanan [20] and Acar et al.
[2], we chose not to examine the JavaScript itself, but instead monitor the data that is
actually transferred back from the browser. We only looked at the data transmitted,
rather than analyzing the downloaded JavaScript, for two main reasons: manual analysis
of JavaScript on this scale was infeasible, and detection of certain scripts, as noted in
3.2, has limitations. Moreover, the data that is sent was the key issue of concern for us,
not so much how it is gathered. That is, we based our fingerprinting detection on an
analysis of the data that is communicated, regardless of the recipient.
We used a simple method to decide whether a web server is performing browser
fingerprinting. That is, we looked at the data sent back from the browser to the visited
website after the first web page was loaded, and checked whether we could detect any
data that is potentially being collected for the purposes of fingerprinting. The precise
definition of the data types that triggered our decision is given in Section 3.5.3. To try
to “normalize” web server behaviour, we looked only at the interactions that occur when
a browser initially visits the homepage of the website, rather than other information
gathering exercises that might occur (e.g. when a user tries to log in). We opted only to
examine the homepages of tested websites since other studies, such as that of Nikiforakis
et al. [61] that involved crawling up to 20 pages of every tested website, failed to find
any benefit from visiting pages other than homepages.
3.5.2 Experimental Set Up
In order to select which websites to crawl, we retrieved the top 10,000 websites from the
freely available Majestic list of the one million most visited websites1. As noted above,
we only looked at the interactions that occur when a browser initially visits the homepage
of a website, rather than other information gathering exercises that may occur (e.g.
when a user tried to log on), in order to try to “normalize” website behaviour. This of
course means that we missed websites that employ interaction-triggered fingerprinting.
The crawler was created using Selenium WebDriver2, a Python script, the Finger-
printAlert Chrome extension (described in Chapter 6), and the Chrome browser itself.
Summaries of the crawler components and the devices used for the study are given
1Majestic is a website specializing in web usage statistics, and provides a daily-updated list of the top
one million websites, https://majestic.com/reports/majestic-million [accessed on 09/10/2017].
2Selenium is open-source software used to automate browsers for testing purposes — see https:
//www.seleniumhq.org.
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in Tables 3.2 and 3.3 respectively, and the structure of the experimental platform is
depicted in Figure 3.1. The Python script instructs Selenium to visit the 10,000 websites
in the list, wait for each to fully load, and then wait for a further short period before
moving to the next website. The code for the Python script is given in Appendix B.
Table 3.2: Crawler software components
Component Details
Browser extension FingerprintAlert 1.0
Programming language Python 3.6.3
Automation tool Selenium 3.8.1
Table 3.3: Computing environment used for crawling
Component Details
Device MacBook Pro (10.1.1)
OS MacOS Sierra 12.1
Browser Chrome 62.0.3202.94
Figure 3.1: Crawler components and their interactions
The delay is included because, in preparatory work, we manually visited 50 websites
on the list and found that following the full loading of the page some only relayed
information after a delay ranging from one second to several minutes. Such waits seem
likely to be both to allow the various elements of the web page to be loaded and executed,
and to take account of dynamic content (e.g. advertisements) being continuously loaded.
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We set the short delay to three seconds; this was a fairly arbitrary choice, although it was
long enough to cause a number of websites to transmit data, although not sufficiently
long to make the crawling process significantly more time consuming.
The extension collects and stores all data that is relayed from the browser to one or
more web servers using the GET, POST or HEAD HTTP methods3 [25], i.e. the commonly
used means by which information, including attributes used for fingerprinting, is relayed
from browser to server. Whether or not the data was sent SSL/TLS-protected, i.e. using
HTTPS [69], was also recorded.
The crawling process took approximately 300 hours to complete. It took this long
for several reasons, including that some websites took several minutes to fully load, and
that Selenium occasionally crashed. In such cases, the crawler was restarted manually,
and we re-crawled websites after a crash to ensure we did not miss any data.
3.5.3 Data Processing
Prior to the full crawling process we initially crawled a smaller sample (approximately
1,000 of the websites) to test the crawler. In this process we indiscriminately collected all
data sent (if any) from the browser to web servers. Manual examination of the collected
data revealed that in many cases it included information unrelated to the visiting device
or the browser (e.g. the URLs of displayed advertisements), i.e. of no interest to this
study. Most importantly for our purposes, we were also able to identify fingerprinting
attributes that had unique formats or values (e.g. screen resolution: 1920x1080) that
made automatic detection possible.
Using these preliminary findings, we programmed our crawler to automatically
detect a set of 17 attribute values. To achieve this we first collected the precise values
of these 17 attributes for our experimental platform, as summarized in Table 3.4. For
example, this included the public IP address in use at the time of the experiments, i.e.
165.120.95.194. The crawler then used regular expressions to examine all relayed data
and match them against the set of 17 attribute values for the experimental platform. If
the crawler detected that a website was causing the browser to send any of these 17
attribute values to the same or a different website, then it captured the entire HTTP
message and stored it as part of the data collected.
The presence of one or more of the experimental platform attribute values in data
returned by the browser was used to determine whether or not a website was engaged in
fingerprinting. This set of 17 attribute types includes many of the attributes whose use
for fingerprinting is most widely discussed, so we believe that the presence or absence
3The quantity of data that can be relayed using GET or HEAD is very limited, whereas POST allows
the transmission of very large volumes (megabytes) of data.
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of an attribute of one of these types is a reasonable indicator of whether fingerprinting
is being performed. However, some other attribute values are much more complex,
and hence are difficult to automatically identify. In subsequent manual analysis of the
recorded data, we were able to identify many additional attributes because they were
labelled by name in the captured data and their values matched those of the browser
used in the experiment. To perform this task automatically would have been extremely
difficult because some sections of the recorded data were not parsed, and the substrings
of the data that were parsed varied in format (unsurprisingly given the absence of any
standards for data formats for transferred attribute values).
Table 3.4: The 17 chosen browser attributes and their values for the test platform
Attribute Value
Resolution 1280x800
OS Mac OS X
OS Version 10.12.6
User Agent Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_12_6)




WEBGL Renderer WebKit WebGL
WEBGL Vendor WebKit
WEBGL Version WebGL 1.0 (OpenGL ES 2.0 Chromium)
GPU Intel(R) Iris(TM) Graphics 6100
GPU Vendor Intel Inc.
Installed Plugins Chrome PDF Plugin, Chrome PDF Viewer, Native Client,







In order to manually identify fingerprinting attributes in the collected data we
searched for the fingerprinting attributes reported by Alaca and Van Oorschot [6] and
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the BrowserLeaks.com website, including attributes not in the list of 17 attribute types
detectable by the crawler. We then attempted to match these values with the values
in the collected data. Once we completed the matching, we manually inspected the
matches found; this was necessary to ensure that the matches found were genuine
and not coincidental similarities in strings or numbers. In most cases the match was
confirmed by finding labels followed by the expected values in the collected data.
3.6 Challenges and Limitations
We faced a number of challenges in both implementing crawling and processing the
collected data. First, websites are unlikely to admit use of browser fingerprinting, and
so we can only attempt to judge their behaviour based on the types of information
retrieved from the browser, and when it was collected. As discussed in Chapter 2, there
is a wide range of attributes that, when put together, can be used to create a unique
device fingerprint. Identifying and monitoring all such attributes is very challenging,
especially since new attributes seem to arise frequently (given continuously evolving
browser functionality). Moreover, many websites cause the browser to send a series
of data strings back to the server; automatically, or even manually, identifying what
these data represent is highly non-trivial. It was not always possible to parse the data
sent since there is no standard for such data transmissions; indeed, some websites may
deliberately obfuscate the data they send. It was therefore impossible to fully interpret
all the data. Fortunately, there are certain attributes that are easily identifiable because
of their special format and range of values, such as screen resolution (e.g. 1920x1080),
fonts (e.g. Arial), or geolocation coordinates (e.g. 51.4167, -0.5667).
It is very difficult to determine the minimum number of attributes needed to produce
a unique fingerprint. Fingerprint uniqueness depends on many factors, including the
range of values of an attribute, how often it changes, and how much it varies across
browsers and host platforms. As a result, we made the simplifying assumption that a
website is deemed to be engaging in browser fingerprinting if it causes a browser to send
at least one of the 17 attribute values given in Table 3.4.
As noted in Section 3.5.2, the crawler only visited the homepages of the chosen
10,000 websites. Websites we reported as not deploying browser fingerprinting might
nevertheless still be doing so on other pages. Moreover, the attribute collection reported
here was unprompted (i.e. no clicking, cursor movements or typing was involved) except
for loading of the web page. Through manual visits to selected websites, we found that
some websites only cause the browser to send fingerprinting attribute values when there
are further interactions. Moreover, some websites only retrieved attributes when a user
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submits a form or logs in, and such cases would be too complex (if not impossible) to
capture automatically. The focus of this study is fingerprinting that targets everyone,
including those engaged in casual browsing.
As our crawler was Selenium-based, it suffered from the known crashing problem [20]
on certain websites, e.g. when it was unable to fully load all the elements of a website.
In such cases the crawler had to be manually restarted. On average, Selenium crashed
after crawling 155 websites. Moreover, Chrome extensions are limited to 5MB of storage
and so, to ensure that the collected data did not reach that limit, we programmed the
crawler to stop after every 200 visited websites, yielding an average of 3MB of collected
data. However, Selenium usually crashed before reaching the 200-website limit.
The crawler was set to allow a website a maximum of 60 seconds to fully load before
it timed out. We found that the tested 10,000 websites took an average of 19 seconds
to fully load. Our tests were performed using an Internet connection with a minimum
bandwidth of 40 Mbps, and so connection limitations are unlikely to be the reason for
the loading delays. The time to load a website noticeably increased as we went through
the list of crawled websites, i.e. the less popular websites loaded more slowly. So, in
future similar experiments, we would recommend that crawlers should not timeout until
at least 20 seconds have elapsed.
3.7 Results
The data collected in this study, as well as the tools we used for data collection
and analysis, are available at https://github.com/fingerprintable. The dataset
includes the contents of all HTTP messages sent by and to the crawled websites that
the crawler identified as performing fingerprinting. This includes the data retrieved
from the visiting device (i.e. the device used for data gathering), as well as the domain
names of the sender and receiver of the data. Figure 3.2 shows a sample of a complete
block of data from amongst those collected in our study.
Using a combination of automated parsing and manual inspection, we detected the
transmission of 286 different attribute types. We further detected 1,914 distinct websites
that collected data for fingerprinting. 70 of the 10,000 websites (i.e. 0.7%) timed out
(e.g. because the website did not respond) during the crawling process and thus were
fully, or partially, excluded from our findings. Overall, 6,876 (68.8%) of the crawled
websites caused the browser on the experimental platform to send data that could be
used for browser fingerprinting (either to the same or another website, i.e. first-party
or third-party fingerprinting). We refer to such websites as fingerprinting websites; of
course, despite the name, the fingerprinting websites might not actually be using the
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Figure 3.2: Excerpt of collected data
collected data for fingerprinting.
Fingerprinting is most commonly performed by third-party sites; 84.5% of the 6,876
sites collecting data sent it only to third parties. Of the rest, 2.4% were exclusively
first-party fingerprinters, with the other 13.1% using both first- and third-party data
collection. Over the 6,876 fingerprinting websites, data was sent to an average of 3.42
domains. The largest number of different data-collecting websites to which data was
sent for a single visited website was 42.
Fingerprinting websites collected an average of 1.75KB of data. The third-party
websites that collected the most data were yandex4 (2.9MB), optimizely5 (2.8MB) and
casalemedia6 (2.1MB). Figure 3.3 shows the top 10 third-party websites in terms of
collected data volume for a single visiting browser.
Of the attributes the crawler can automatically detect, the three most frequently
collected were: screen/browser resolution, language, and charset (i.e. character encoding).
We found that fingerprinters collected, on average, five of the attribute types listed
in Table 3.4. Figure 3.4 summarizes the 10 most frequently collected attribute types.
The most widely used fingerprinting third-party was google-analytics7 (see Appendix
A.2 for a complete list of fingerprinting third parties); google-analytics provides web
analytics as well as other web-based services to websites. This finding is consistent with
studies those of non-fingerprinting-based tracking (e.g. of Schelter and Kunegis [73]
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Figure 3.3: Top 10 fingerprinters in terms of collected data volume per browser
As noted above, amongst the collected data we were able to identify 286 fingerprinting
attributes, which we divided into six categories (see Table 3.5). The full list of 286
attributes can be found in Appendix C.
Table 3.5: Summary of identified fingerprinting attributes
Attribute Type WebGL Features Media IO* Network Misc. Total
Count 114 66 41 20 10 35 286
*Input/Output
3.8 Analysis
3.8.1 Processing Collected Data
As described above, the crawler logged every website that relayed data if one, or more, of
the 17 pre-programmed attribute values were detected. We examined random samples of
the collected data to identify the presence of any false positives. We found some HTTP
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Figure 3.4: Top 10 collected attributes
messages that contained data that were incorrectly matched with one of the 17 attribute
values. We wrote a script to remove such records (e.g. if the string 1280088.jpeg
matched with the screen resolution width 1280). However, in general, identifying false
positives (if any) in the filtered data is non-trivial, since the ability to fingerprint
browsers typically depends on both the number and type of collected attributes. For
example, Mowery and Shacham [56] have demonstrated that the Canvas API alone could
be enough to fingerprint a browser, and Laperdrix et al. [44] demonstrated a seemingly
successful method of fingerprinting based on a specific set of just 17 attributes.
3.8.2 Prevalence of Fingerprinting
Our study confirms the findings of Englehardt and Narayanan [20] that fingerprinting
is commonplace, at least by widely-used websites, and yet there are a relatively small
number of entities actually collecting and processing attributes (mainly third-party
trackers). Indeed, the top five third-party fingerprinting domains (see Figure 3.5) are
all part of a single company, Google Inc. This finding is consistent with Libert [47],
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who found that 78.07% of the top one million websites send data to a Google-owned
domain. Moreover, it is consistent with Haga et al. [32] who found that google-analytics
is, potentially, the most prevalent fingerprinter. An extended list of fingerprinters can
be found in Appendix A.
Figure 3.5: Top third-party fingerprinting domains
We found that 68.8% of the top 10,000 websites are potentially engaged in finger-
printing, although, as shown in Table 3.2, previous studies have yielded rather different
results. For example, in 2013, Nikiforakis et al. [61] found that only 0.4% of the top
10,000 websites deployed fingerprinting. A year later, Acar et al. [1] reported that
5% of the top 100,000 websites deployed browser fingerprinting using the Canvas API.
In 2015, FaizKhademi et al. [22] found that 42.6% of the top 10,000 websites were
likely to be engaging in fingerprinting. It thus seems likely that both the prevalence of
browser fingerprinting and the number of attributes being collected for this purpose
have significantly increased.
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3.8.3 Fingerprinting Attributes
As discussed in 3.5.3, we were able to identify 286 fingerprintable attribute values
retrievable from the browser used in our experiment. We were able to confirm their
presence by comparing attributes in data collected by the crawler with attributes
reported by Alaca and Van Oorschot [6] and the BrowserLeaks website. This gave us
an indication of the range of attributes that are collected in the real world, as opposed
to those discussed in the literature, and also helped us improve the functioning of the
extension described in Chapter 6.
It is worth noting that the number of attributes reported in our study is much
larger than those reported by previous studies. This is partly explained by the fact
that previous studies have searched for a smaller number of attributes; for example
Eckersley [18] and Cao et al. [12] looked for just 10 and 53 attributes respectively. The
significantly higher number we found also seems likely to be a result of the growing use
of browser fingerprinting [2, 61], and the fact that we monitored the HTTP messages
transmitted between visited websites and potential trackers as opposed to only detecting
the presence of known fingerprinting scripts, as previously widely performed. All of
the attributes we were able to identify are collectable by BrowserLeaks.com. However,
BrowserLeaks.com can also collect many attributes that we did not find any websites to
be collecting, including many of the browser features collectable by Modernizr8.
3.8.4 Deployment of HTTPS
Some fingerprinting websites do not use HTTPS to send the fingerprinting attributes,
which are thus transmitted in plaintext; this is a potentially significant user privacy
threat. Of the 1,914 distinct fingerprinters we detected, as many as 683 used only
HTTP for attribute transmission, 274 mixed use of HTTP and HTTPS, and the
remaining 957 used only HTTPS. That is, 50% of the fingerprinting websites used
HTTP at least in some cases for transmitting what could be construed as personally
identifiable information. Seemingly, the use of HTTP is more common in less popular
websites, as Merzdovnik et al. [53] reported that as many as 60% of the top 100,000
websites performing fingerprinting used HTTP. These results apply only to the use of
HTTP/HTTPS for transmitting browser attributes, not to whether or not the visited
website uses HTTPS. It is interesting to note that we identified a fingerprinting website
that used the WebSocket protocol9 as well as HTTP.
8A JavaScript library that help websites detect the availability of CSS and HTML5 features in a
visitor’s browser https://modernizr.com.
9WebSocket is a relatively new full-duplex TCP communication protocol [24]. Bashir et al. [8] have
described how trackers typically utilize the WebSocket protocol to circumvent ad blockers on browsers.
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3.8.5 Fingerprint IDs
Some websites cause a browser to send a value that is explicitly labelled fingerprint
or fp, along with fingerprinting attribute values. These values are typically strings of
alphanumerics (e.g. b5a2ab93-9415-32be-b1ca-c3ddabb110cc) that appear to func-
tion as platform/user identifiers. Evidently, some first- and third-party trackers share
such user identifiers [23], allowing them to compile extensive profiles of users. This also
means that a website or a tracker could acquire user- or platform-related information
without any prior interaction with that user. Such ID-sharing practices clearly make
browser fingerprinting-based tracking more privacy-threatening.
3.9 Relationship to the Prior Art
As discussed in 3.2, the study of Libert [47] provides an upper bound on the prevalence
of browser fingerprinting at the time it was conducted, because he assumed that all
third-party scripts could potentiality be used for fingerprinting. Hence, it might be
expected that the prevalence of fingerprinting found by this study would be less, given
the method used was less indiscriminate, which was indeed the case. A further difference
between the work described here and all other previous studies, including that of
Englehardt and Narayanan [20], is that they examined the fingerprinting scripts while
we examined the data relayed back to server via HTTP. Most significantly, and as
discussed in 3.8.2, we not only detected a level of fingerprinting prevalence that was less
than that found by Libert [47], but it was much greater than that found by all other
studies. Indeed, our results suggest that fingerprinting is becoming ubiquitous. This is
consistent with the findings of the large scale study by Lerner et al. [45], that examined
the prevalence of online tracking between 1996 and 2016. They have demonstrated an
exponential increase in the use of fingerprinting-based tracking in recent years.
Given that this is a rapidly changing and evolving area, it is important to repeat
studies frequently, and so one contribution of this study is to reveal the current state
of the art. We do not claim that the approach we have adopted is better than other
approaches, but it does have the advantage of being based purely on the data itself,
and not on the many and various scripts that might be used to fingerprint browsers.
Our study has enabled us to give an up to date, fairly comprehensive, and large-scale
list of the attributes being used in practice for browser fingerprinting.
Ethical Issues. Clearly any experiment involving real world websites raises po-
tential ethical issues. However, no data relating to individuals were accessed, no
vulnerabilities in websites were discovered or exploited, and all websites were accessed
as intended by their providers. Websites were crawled only once, except in cases of
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a crawler crash where an additional visit was required. All the results are publicly
available, as described in Section 3.7.
3.10 Summary
Browser fingerprinting is a relatively new method of uniquely identifying browsers that
can be used to track web users. In some ways it is more privacy-threatening than
tracking via cookies, as users have no direct control over it. A number of authors have
considered the wide variety of techniques that can be used to fingerprint browsers;
however, as we have described, relatively limited information is available on how
widespread browser fingerprinting is, and what information is collected to create these
fingerprints in the real world. There is limited information available in the literature
on how widespread browser fingerprinting is at present, and what information is being
collected to create these fingerprints. To address this we crawled the 10,000 most visited
websites; this gave insights into the number of websites that are using the technique,
which websites are collecting fingerprinting information, and exactly what information is
being retrieved. We found that approximately 69% of websites are, potentially, involved
in first-party or third-party browser fingerprinting. We further found that third-party







The work described in this chapter is mostly based on [4]. In this chapter we describe
a series of systematic tests performed on currently widely used browsers, which show
that some browsers reveal substantially more fingerprinting information than others.
Hence users of the least privacy-respecting browsers can more readily be identified
and/or tracked. As discussed in Chapter 2, a number of authors have examined the
effectiveness of various techniques for browser fingerprinting, but to our knowledge
no-one has previously compared the effectiveness of fingerprinting across a range of
browsers.
We performed the tests using a specially established website1. This website does not
retain any data recovered from visiting browsers, but simply displays the information
that it is able to collect from the currently employed browser. We hope that this site
will be a useful tool in promoting general understanding of the privacy threat arising
from browser fingerprinting, and more generally from some of the features provided by
today’s browsers when executing JavaScript.
As discussed in 2.2, over the last nine years, a number of authors have performed
detailed studies of the effectiveness of a range of browser fingerprinting techniques. We
used a selection of known fingerprinting approaches to compare the fingerprintability
of widely used web browsers on both desktop and mobile platforms. Since desktop
browsers differ significantly from their mobile counterparts in their capabilities and
1https://fingerprintable.org. All the scripts used in our experiments are publicly available —
see Appendix D.
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features (e.g. plugins cannot be installed on mobile browsers), we made parallel studies
for these two platform types.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. We start in Section 4.2 with
the methodology used in our experiments. In Section 4.3 we discuss the experimental
results. In 4.4, a summary of the chapter is provided.
4.2 Methodology
We performed our experiments on five of the most widely used platform types. Specif-
ically, we chose to examine browsers running on Windows 10 and Mac OS X 10.12
(Sierra) for desktop platforms, and Android 7.0 (Nugget), iOS 10.2.1 and Windows 10
Mobile for mobile devices (full specifications of the devices used in this experiment are
given in Appendices E.2 and E.3). Further details of the methodology we employed
to examine browser fingerprintability, including the set of browsers we examined, are
given below. Precise details of the versions of operating systems and browsers used are
given in Appendix E.1.
4.2.1 Browsers
As noted above, given the major functional differences between desktop and mobile
browsers, we made parallel studies of the two classes. For both mobile and desk-
top platforms, we chose to examine the five most widely used browsers according to
netmarketshare.com2.
• The desktop browsers we examined were Chrome, Internet Explorer, Firefox,
Edge and Safari.
• The mobile browsers used in our tests were Chrome, Safari, Opera Mini,
Firefox and Edge. We excluded Mobile Internet Explorer and Android Browser
because they are no longer being developed or included with new devices3. Specifi-
cally, Google has replaced its native Android Browser with Chrome, and Microsoft
has replaced Internet Explorer with Edge in Windows 10 Mobile.
4.2.2 Installation Options
The use of browser extensions and plugins can both increase and decrease the information
available for fingerprinting. The presence of extensions inherently increases fingerprinting
2https://www.netmarketshare.com/browser-market-share.aspx [accessed on 03/03/2017]
3At the time of the study, Internet Explorer and Android Browser were used by approximately 5%
of mobile browser users, according to NetMarketShare.
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capabilities, since the set of installed extensions (information that is typically available
to executing JavaScript) helps individualize a browser; in addition, some extensions
reveal information that can identify the user or browser instance (see 2.3.2 and Fiore et
al. [27]). On the other hand, as we discuss in Chapter 7, specially designed anonymizing
extensions can be used to conceal a browser’s fingerprint. To avoid biasing the results,
in our tests we used clean installations of browsers so that they did not include any
extensions or plugins other than those installed and enabled by default. We could have
chosen to disable even those extensions that are present and enabled by default, but we
chose to leave them on the basis that many users will not change the browser default
settings; hence testing the browser “out of the box” gives the fairest assessment of its
privacy properties.
In fact, the browsers we examined come with very few installed and enabled exten-
sions; Edge and Internet Explorer are the only browsers we tested that come with the
Flash plugin installed and enabled by default. Although Chrome comes with the Flash
plugin installed, it is disabled.
The mobile browsers require various permissions to be set as part of their installation.
In addition, browsers may request extra permissions while executing, depending on
the features of a visited website (e.g. to request permission to take pictures and record
video). For testing purposes, we did not grant any permissions other than those needed
for browser installation.
4.2.3 Experimental Scripts
To test the fingerprintability of the selected browsers, a web page containing JavaScript
was constructed, intended to be served by our experimental website. Whenever the
website is visited by a client browser, e.g. one of those being tested, the scripts in the
web page interrogate the browser to learn the values of a set of identifying attributes
(as discussed in Section 4.2.4). The scripts used in the experiments were largely based
on the BrowserLeaks website as well as those available in the GitHub open repositories.
The web page displayed by the browser contains a summary of the information
gathered by the script, and thereby provides an instant summary of the privacy properties
of the browser. As mentioned elsewhere, this site is publicly available, and is open for
general use. A partial screenshot of a typical displayed page is shown in Figure 4.1.
The total size of the script used is approximately 70KB; in informal tests it loaded
and displayed the results without any noticeable delay.
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Figure 4.1: Partial screenshot of the Fingerprintability Test page
4.2.4 Attributes
The original goal of our experiments was to sample all the attributes that can be
collected from a web browser. Any attribute that is not fixed for all browsers has
potential value for fingerprinting. However, a large number of attributes have Boolean
values (e.g. Java installed?) or one of a very limited set of values (e.g. Java version) and
hence they typically give relatively little identifying information. Given the significant
number of such attributes, we therefore omitted all attributes of this type from our
tests, and focused on a set of six that have the potential to give significantly more
information.
We omitted attributes that, according to Laperdrix et al. [44], take more than a few
seconds to collect (e.g. font metrics [26]), or are unreliable for fingerprinting purposes
(e.g. battery level [63]). Additionally, we omitted attributes that are made available by
all tested browsers as part of their typical functionality (e.g. screen resolution). It is
worth noting that some attributes are related to the user’s machine and thus can be
used to help identify a specific platform even if a user subsequently switches browsers
[12]. Others are browser-specific, and hence can only be used for fingerprinting as long
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as the same browser is used.
We next discuss in detail the six fingerprinting attributes used in our tests.
Installed Font Set through Flash
As described in 2.3, several methods can be used to identify the set of fonts installed
on a device; one involves the use of Flash. If the Adobe Flash plugin is installed
and enabled, it can be used to reveal the set, and installation order, of fonts installed
on the user platform; this is known to be a highly discriminating attribute (see, for
example, Eckersley [18]). Moreover, this attribute can be used to fingerprint a platform
even if multiple browsers are used. However, of the desktop browsers we examined,
only Edge and Internet Explorer have Flash installed and enabled by default. In this
respect, Edge and Internet Explorer are therefore significantly less privacy-protecting
than their competitors, since a browser/platform is less identifiable when learning the
set of installed fonts is performed without using Flash.
None of the mobile browsers we examined support Flash, so the set of installed
fonts was not used when comparing the fingerprintability of this class of browsers.
Furthermore, the most widely used mobile operating systems (i.e. Android and iOS) do
not give the user the option to install fonts.
Again as described in 2.3, there are other, albeit less accurate, methods of discovering
the set of installed fonts using website-supplied JavaScript. However, we do not consider
these methods as part of our comparison, since they work in much the same way for all
the tested browsers.
Device ID(s)
The use of a device ID as a fingerprintable attribute was proposed by an anonymous
developer on BrowserLeaks.com4. According to this website, a device ID is a hash value
generated by a browser by applying a cryptographic hash function to the unique ID
of a hardware component in the user platform (combined with other data values); as
described in 2.3 it is retrieved by requesting the WebRTC hardware ID attribute.
The main intended application of such device IDs would appear to relate to managing
multimedia content, and the platform components whose identifiers are used are typically
the loudspeaker, microphone and/or camera. Since the device ID is computed on other
data in addition to a unique hardware identifier, the value computed by a browser will
typically change when accessed by different websites. However, for a single website, the
device ID appears likely to remain constant (at least for some browsers) across multiple
4 https://browserleaks.com/webrtc#webrtc-device-id [accessed on 03/03/2017]
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visits, giving it high value for fingerprinting purposes. Moreover, a device ID seems
to be constant when queried in different ways; for example, we obtained the value via
an embedding iframe on a different website, and it gave the same value as that for
the framed site. In addition to iframe, we were able to achieve the same results using
other HTML embedding tags, namely embed and object.
To the author’s knowledge, there is no description in the literature of any practical
evaluations of this attribute as a technique for fingerprinting, and so its robustness and
usefulness for this purpose has yet to be determined. However, experiments conducted
as part of this study (see Section 4.3) suggests that it has great promise for use in
fingerprinting. This would be an interesting topic for further research. Gaining a better
understanding of how exactly the device ID is computed by the various browsers would
certainly help in such an investigation, although such information does not appear to
be publicly available.
Canvas Image
As described in 2.3, the Canvas API allows a web server to request the return of details
of a rendered image, and since different browsers and platforms will render images
differently, this can be used for browser fingerprinting. All the tested browsers rendered
the sample canvas-rendered image provided by the test script (see Figure 4.2), and as a
result give a fingerprint for that browser. We based our tests on the particularly effective
canvas fingerprinting approach of Englehardt and Narayanan [20]. Although not part
of our comparative experiments, it is interesting to observe that the Tor browser (a
modified version of Firefox that uses the Tor network) displays a warning and asks
the user for permission before rendering a canvas image. However, none of the tested
browsers made such a request.
Figure 4.2: Sample canvas-rendered image used in our tests
Not only does this attribute enable fingerprinting based on the browser in use, but in
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some cases it provides the ability to discriminate between two similar platforms running
the same browser. That is, in some cases the image rendered by the same browser will
differ given a small change in the computing environment.
WebGL Renderer
As described in 2.3, the WebGL Renderer value, as made available via the WebGL
API (if supported), indicates either the CPU or GPU of the host platform. This partic-
ular attribute contains two sub-attributes: UNMASKED VENDOR WEBGL (i.e. CPU/GPU
manufacturer) and UNMASKED RENDERER WEBGL (i.e. CPU/GPU model).
The experiments revealed that the UNMASKED VENDOR WEBGL either states the browser
vendor or the CPU/GPU vendor. In both cases it does not provide any useful informa-
tion that cannot be readily found from the UNMASKED RENDERER WEBGL (i.e. identifying
a vendor is trivial once the full CPU/GPU model details are known) or the user agent
HTTP header field readily reveals the browser vendor. We therefore focussed solely on
the UNMASKED RENDERER WEBGL value.
User Agent
As discussed in 2.3, the user agent HTTP header field is a rich source of fingerprinting
information. However, we found that all tested desktop browsers provide much the same
level of detail, and so this attribute is not useful in comparing their fingerprintability.
We therefore do not use this attribute when comparing desktop browsers. However, it
remains useful for comparing the fingerprintability of mobile browsers, since in some
browsers it includes an indication of the model of the mobile phone.
Private IP Address(s)
Ideally, a website cannot discover the real public IP address of a user platform that is
employing a VPN. However, as discussed in greater detail in the next chapter, a website
can learn the browser public IP address as well as the IP address assigned by NAT or a
VPN by exploiting a feature of its WebRTC implementation. Given its potential for
uniquely identifying a platform on its own, we included this attribute in the tests.
4.2.5 Performing the Experiments
Platforms of the specified types, running the chosen operating systems, were equipped
with the relevant browsers (clean installs, as discussed above). The browser was then
made to visit the test website (https://fingerprintable.org) and the data generated
by the script was collected and recorded. The 10 datasets (five for the desktop platform
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and five for the mobile platform) generated were then processed and used to derive the
information given in Section 4.3 below.
Attribute Processing
Each browser was tested for the retrievability of discriminating information for each of
the six fingerprinting attributes described in Section 4.2.4 (except for the user agent
on desktop platforms and the set of installed fonts on mobile devices). For most
attributes, it was straightforward to determine whether or not the browser returned any
fingerprintable values. However, some attributes required some processing to be useful.
For example, an attribute such as user agent always returns a string of information. The
key difference between one browser and another was whether it included information
specific to the system hosting it. These differences were observed and noted.
The device ID was tested for both its existence as well as its persistence. We
observed that the browsers that calculate such a value, at some point calculate a new
value. The main difference between browsers in this respect is in the nature of the
trigger that causes recalculation. This means that some browsers have a more persistent
device ID, i.e. one that is more valuable for fingerprinting, than others.
In most cases the returned canvas-rendered image was the same for a single platform
regardless of the browser. Some browsers also render the same image when running on
two devices that have relatively similar specifications. To find these cases we tested and
compared canvas-rendered images of each browser on two devices with similar hardware.
Fingerprintability Index
For comparison purposes, we ranked each attribute as having a high (3), medium (2)
or low (1) attribute fingerprintability, where high indicates an attribute giving more
information useful for fingerprinting. These assignments are based on previous work as
well as our own qualitative estimations. We have refrained from using the term entropy
or precise entropy values taken from the prior art, as such values are not available for
all the attributes we considered in our study. It is important to note that, regardless of
the ranking of attributes, all attributes in our study provide relatively high entropies,
as explained earlier in the chapter. Based on the study results, we assigned each tested
browser a Fingerprintability Index (FI), which is defined to be the sum of the attribute
fingerprintability values of the six attributes we tested; this gives as a simple rough
measure of the fingerprintability of the browser.
The fonts attribute is ranked as high as it is a highly discriminating piece of
information [18]. Device IDs also have the potential of being highly discriminating;
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however, as discussed earlier, browsers that provide device IDs differ in terms of the
persistence of the values. This attribute is therefore assigned high if the browser shows
no signs of changing this value under typical browser usage, and is assigned medium
if a browser provides a new value with every browsing session. It is assigned low if a
browser provides a new value with every visit or page refresh.
We rank the Canvas API attribute as medium, based on the analysis of Laperdrix
et al. [44]. However, we rank it as low for any browser that returns the same image on
two devices with similar specifications. The WebGL information is ranked as low, as
Alaca and Van Oorschot [6] argue that it provides relatively little information useful for
fingerprinting. This is to be expected since many devices could be using an identical
CPU and/or GPU.
The user agent reveals a lot of information valuable for fingerprinting [6, 12, 44].
However, we rank it only as medium since we focus here purely on whether or not it
includes information on the mobile phone model. We assign a rank of low to the leaking
of private IP addresses. This is because most clients are assigned local IPv4 addresses in
the 192.168.0.x range [6] and such IP addresses tend to be dynamically assigned and so
can change regularly. However, we assign a medium ranking to any browser that reveals
one, or more, of the client’s ULAs in addition to the aforementioned IPv4 address.
4.3 Results
We next summarize the results of our experiments. We divide the discussion into two




We summarize below the key observations arising from our examination of desktop
browsers.
• Chrome did not reveal the set of installed fonts through Flash probing despite
the presence of the Flash plugin; this was because the plugin is disabled by
default. Chrome is unique in generating a very discriminating device ID. The
value remained the same for at least a month, and seems unlikely to change until
the browser cache is cleared.
Canvas image rendering in Chrome resulted in the same hash value on both test
machines. We made the same observation on the mobile version of Chrome.
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When probed for the WebGL attribute values, Chrome gave the full details of the
GPU, including the name and version of the installed graphics API. The local
IPv4 and temporary IPv6 addresses were also revealed.
• Because Internet Explorer comes with the Flash plugin installed and enabled
by default, it can be used to determine the set of installed fonts. Internet Explorer
does not disclose any device IDs (due to its lack of WebRTC support). The hash
value of the image produced using the Canvas API was the same as that generated
by Edge on both test machines. Internet Explorer revealed the specific model of
the CPU. However, Internet Explorer did not reveal the local IP address.
• Firefox does not include the Flash plugin, and hence it does not reveal the list
of installed fonts through Flash probing. It generated device IDs, although this
attribute is less discriminating than in Chrome as the device IDs change with
every browser session.
Firefox produced two different hash values for the canvas-rendered images on the
two test machines. The WebGL probing yielded Mozilla as both the vendor and
renderer (i.e. neither CPU or GPU were revealed). However, Firefox revealed the
client’s local IPv4 address.
• Safari revealed no information for most of the attributes we tested. This is mainly
because of its lack of full WebRTC support and the absence of the Flash plugin.
However, it does support the Canvas API and produced the same image hashes
on the two test devices. Safari also revealed the WebGL renderer details.
• Just like Internet Explorer, Edge comes with the Flash plugin installed and
enabled by default. This reveals the set of fonts installed on the computer, which
is highly valuable for fingerprinting. Edge generates device IDs but they change
every time a website is revisited or even refreshed. It gave the same canvas hash
value as Internet Explorer on the test machines. It also revealed the CPU model.
Moreover, amongst tested desktop browsers, it was unique in exposing three IP
addresses, namely the client’s local IPv4, IPv6 and ULA.
Discussion
The results of our tests are summarized in Table 4.1. Only Chrome, Firefox, and Edge
provided device IDs. The fingerprintability of this attribute varies significantly between
tested browsers. Chrome device IDs are consistent and do not change unless the user
43
4.3. Results 4. Comparing Browser Fingerprintability
Table 4.1: Desktop browser fingerprintability
Attribute / Browser Chrome Internet Explorer Firefox Safari Edge
Fonts - ••• - - •••
Device ID ••• - •• - •
Canvas • • •• • •
WebGL Renderer •• • - • •
Local IP Address •• - • - •••
Fingerprintability Index 8 5 5 2 9
•= low; ••= medium; •••= high
selects the private browsing mode5 feature or clears the browser cache. The Firefox
device ID remained the same during multiple visits in a single browsing session, but
changed once the browser was reopened. Of the browsers generating device IDs, Edge
gave the value that changed most readily; merely refreshing a web page caused Edge
to generate a new value. This makes this attribute in Edge of very limited use for
fingerprinting.
All the tested browsers support the Canvas API and rendered the scripted image in
our test, i.e. they all reveal this fingerprinting attribute. However, in the case of Firefox,
the image resulted in a different hash when rendered on the two test machines. As a
result, the canvas-rendered images attribute is more fingerprintable in Firefox than the
other tested browsers.
With the exception of Safari and Internet Explorer, all the tested browsers exposed
the client’s local IPv4 address. Both Edge and Chrome also revealed the IPv6 address.
However, Edge was the only tested browser to reveal the client’s ULAs. Overall, Edge
was the most fingerprintable (FI: 9) and Safari the least (FI: 2).
4.3.2 Mobile Browsers
Overview
Summarized below are the main observations arising from our examination of mobile
browsers.
• The Chrome user agent revealed the specific phone model. Just like its desktop
counterpart, Chrome provided persistent device IDs. Chrome’s rendering of the
canvas image resulted in the same hash on both testing devices. It also revealed
the vendor and model of the GPU, as well as the local IPv4 and ULA addresses.
• Safari mobile did not reveal much fingerprinting information except the informa-
5Chrome did not assign a device ID when private mode was enabled.
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tion derivable from rendering the canvas image and the CPU model through the
WebGL API. It rendered the same canvas image on both test devices.
• The Opera Mini user agent revealed the phone model. It provided device
IDs that were similar to Firefox in terms of calculating a new value with every
new browsing session. It also rendered unique canvas images on tested devices.
Moreover, it revealed the GPU model, as well as the local IPv4 and ULA addresses.
• Firefox did not reveal the phone model in the user agent field, which makes this
attribute significantly less revealing. However, Firefox did provide device IDs in
the same way as its desktop counterpart. It also rendered unique canvas images
on tested devices and allowed the retrieval of the client’s local IPv4 and ULA
addresses. The WebGL did not reveal the vendor nor renderer.
• The Edge user agent included the model of the phone. Edge provided device IDs
but, like its desktop counterpart, the IDs change with every page refresh or revisit.
It also revealed the model of the GPU. The canvas-rendered image was the same
on both test devices. Unlike its desktop version, Edge did not expose any private
IP addresses.
Table 4.2: Mobile browser fingerprintability
Attribute / Browser Chrome Safari Opera Mini Firefox Edge
User Agent •• - •• - ••
Device ID ••• - •• •• •
Canvas • • •• •• •
WebGL Renderer • • • - •
Local IP Address •• - •• •• -
Fingerprintability Index 9 2 9 6 5
•= low; ••= medium; •••= high
Discussion
The results of our tests are summarized in Table 4.2. Chrome, Opera Mini and Edge
included the phone model as part of the user agent field. With the exception of Safari,
all tested browsers calculated device IDs.
Although all tested browsers rendered the canvas image, Chrome, Safari, and Edge
(both desktop and mobile) rendered exactly the same image on the test devices with
similar specifications. This makes Chrome, Safari and Edge canvas-rendered images
less fingerprintable than the other tested browsers.
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Chrome, Opera Mini, and Firefox exposed the local IPv4 addresses. However, unlike
their desktop counterparts, they also exposed the client’s ULA(s). Overall, Chrome
and Opera Mini were the most fingerprintable browsers (FI: 9). Just like its desktop
counterpart, Safari was the least fingerprintable (FI: 2).
4.3.3 Other Remarks
It seems reasonable to expect that browser fingerprinting based on the Flash plugin will
soon become irrelevant given the imminent disappearance of Flash [44]. In regards to
the Canvas API, it is important to note that it is not the rendering aspect of the Canvas
API that endangers user privacy but the ability to retrieve details of the rendered image
by visited websites. Thus, if this feature was removed from the Canvas API, it would
eliminate any possible fingerprinting based on it (at least using current methods). This
is an issue that we revisit in a more general context in Chapter 7.
Device IDs have the potential to seriously endanger user privacy, especially given
their persistence in Chrome. Moreover, Chrome’s persistent device IDs seem unnecessary,
given that Edge constantly provides new values.
4.4 Summary
Collectively unique and hence identifying pieces of information, making up what is
known as a fingerprint, can be collected from browsers by a visited website, e.g. using
JavaScript. However, browsers vary in precisely what information they make available,
and hence their fingerprintability may also vary. In this chapter, we reported on the
results of experiments examining the fingerprintable attributes made available by a
range of modern browsers. We tested the most widely used browsers for both desktop
and mobile platforms. The results revealed that Safari was the least fingerprintable
browser in both mobile and desktop devices. On the other hand, Chrome was the
most fingerprintable mobile browser, while Edge was the most fingerprintable desktop
browser. The results revealed significant differences between browsers in terms of their




IP Address Compromise through
Browser Fingerprinting
5.1 Introduction
The work described in this chapter is largely based on [3]. This chapter focuses on a
potentially rich source of browser fingerprinting information arising from a feature of
the WebRTC API. We evaluated the availability of this source in a number of browsers.
Since the information leaked consists of one or more IP addresses, this leak is especially
significant when a VPN is in use, and hence we also tested a number of different VPNs.
Ideally, when a user connects to the Internet via a Virtual Private Network (VPN),
the IP addresses (e.g. the public IP address) of the client device are hidden from visited
websites. However, as described in 2.3, the client’s public IP address can be retrieved
by successfully pinging a STUN/TURN server through a visiting WebRTC-supporting
browser. If a user is using a VPN for anonymity reasons, then revealing one, or more, of
the client’s IP addresses to a visited website (or any browser extension that can execute
JavaScript on the client’s browser) is likely to negate one major purpose of VPN use.
Revealing client IP address(es) could also help enable tracking and/or identification of
the client as part of browser fingerprinting. Moreover, by using geolocation lookup, a
client’s public IP address could disclose its country and city [39].
In this chapter, we describe experiments performed to examine five types of client
IP address that could be revealed via WebRTC functionality. We also examined to what
degree the choice of browser, VPN service and VPN client-side configuration affects the
number and type of leaked addresses. A related investigation has been described by
Perta et al. [67], who observed the role of the VPN service in IP address leaks. However,
they focused only on IPv6 address leaks without looking at other types of IP address or
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the role of the browser in the leaks. Moreover, the address leaks they considered are
apparently not WebRTC-related. This is the first study to examine all the types of IP
address that could leak, as well the first to consider the role of the browser in these
leaks.
It is important to note that a WebRTC leak could damage client privacy even if a
VPN is not in use. This is because the client private IP address could be leaked, a piece
of information which would not otherwise be available to a visited website even in the
absence of a VPN. However, these addresses are not necessarily very privacy-sensitive,
since clients are typically assigned private IPv4 addresses in the 192.168.0.x range [6].
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. In Section 5.2 we discuss the
types of IP address that could potentially be leaked via WebRTC. We review prior work
related to WebRTC leaks in Section 5.3. The research methodology employed as well as
details of the experiments performed are discussed in Sections 5.4 and 5.5. In Section
5.6, we report on and analyze the results of these experiments. Before summarizing the
chapter in Section 5.9, we discuss WebRTC leak countermeasures in Section 5.7 and
briefly mention disclosure issues in Section 5.8.
5.2 IP Addresses At Risk
In the experiments (see Section 5.5) we found that WebRTC functionality can be
exploited to reveal one or more of five types of client IP address, as listed below. Note
that the public IPv4 address of a client is not in the list, as in the experiments we
performed we were never able to learn such an address using WebRTC.
• Public IPv6 address: this is the IPv6 address of the platform and is typically
assigned by the ISP of the client.
• Public Temporary IPv6 address: this address is assigned by the network to which
the client platform is attached.
• Unique local address (ULA) assigned by LAN : this IPv6 address is assigned by
the network to which the client platform is attached, and is the approximate IPv6
counterpart of the Private IPv4 address assigned by LAN [34].
• Private IP address assigned by the VPN server : this private (IPv4 or IPv6,
depending on the VPN configuration) address is assigned by the VPN server.
• Private IPv4 address assigned by LAN : this address is assigned by the network to
which the client platform is attached.
48
5.3. Previous Work 5. IP Address Compromise through Browser Fingerprinting
It is important to note that due to differences in length and uniqueness, the disclosure
of an IPv6 address is more privacy-damaging than that of the private IPv4 address.
Moreover, the Public IPv6 address on the experimental platforms remained the same
throughout more than two months of testing, while the temporary IPv6 address changed
with every connection instance. While the persistence of an IP address depends on the
client and network configuration, it seems clear that the public IPv6 address is more
persistent than a temporary IPv6 address (hence the name temporary).
More generally, the degree to which the disclosure of a particular type of IP address
degrades user privacy depends on its uniqueness and persistence. For example, a
private IPv4 address (4 bytes) is typically in the 192.168.0.x range, and is thus far
less privacy-sensitive than a public IPv6 address (16 bytes). Moreover, a leak of the
IP addresses of clients that are assigned static (i.e. fixed) IP addresses will be more
privacy-compromising than if these addresses are dynamically assigned (i.e. they change
regularly).
5.3 Previous Work
WebRTC leaks (see also 2.3.2) have been discussed by a number of authors — see, for
example, [6, 20, 35, 37, 48, 67]. Of this prior art, Jakobsson [37] explores WebRTC
leaks in the greatest depth, but focuses only on public IP address leaks.
Alaca and Van Oorschot [6] observed that WebRTC features could enable a visited
website to learn the IP addresses assigned to all the network interfaces of a client
platform, including the private IP addresses assigned by a VPN. They deemed this
possibility to be a medium-level threat, which seems a reasonable evaluation given they
only observed the possibility of private IP address leaks. However, they state in their
evaluation that the WebRTC leak issue requires further study.
Englehardt and Narayanan [20] consider the WebRTC threat in some depth, but
like many other authors they also only examine private IP address leaks. Liu et al. [48]
also only examine leaking of private IP addresses. They claim that the WebRTC issue
is only applicable to Chrome and Firefox, but it is not clear what browsers and which
versions they tested (the results we obtained, described in Section 5.5, contradict this
claim).
Hosoi et al. [35] point out that public IP addresses could be amongst those leaked.
As previously mentioned, Perta et al. [67] explore IPv6 address leaks in detail. They
report on the results of IP address leak tests of 14 VPN services; however, they do not
describe the role of WebRTC in these leaks. A recent IETF Internet Draft [81], details
browser mechanisms that can potentially prevent WebRTC-related IP address leaks.
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In summary, a number of authors have examined the WebRTC issue, but none have
made a comprehensive survey of the issue; typically they have either only examined
some of the possible IP addresses that can be leaked, or they have not considered the
roles of both the browser and the VPN service in affecting the magnitude of the leaks.
In the remainder of this chapter we describe the results of the first comprehensive study
of the WebRTC leak issue, including examining the roles of the browser, VPN service
and VPN configuration in affecting the nature and volume of IP addresses leaked. This
enables us to make recommendations to end users on how they might optimize their
behaviour to minimize their loss of privacy. We have also provided a website which
enables users to test the privacy properties of their own current browser and VPN
configurations.
5.4 Experimental Methodology
We used a modified version of Roesler’s publicly available JavaScript1 to perform the
experiments (see Appendix F for the code). The modification incorporates some of the
features provided by BrowserLeaks.com that enable the script to work with Edge, which
Roesler’s original script does not support. Preliminary tests revealed that the number
and type of leaked addresses are affected by the choices for both the web browser and
the VPN service. We therefore tested five different widely used VPN services running
on eight different browser-OS combinations, namely four browsers each running on
Windows2 and macOS3. Since we had no information regarding the VPN services that
are most widely used, we informally selected five of the top search results in Google. The
VPN services we chose to examine are: Hide My A**! (HMA!), ZenMate, ExpressVPN,
VyprVPN and TorGuard. Full details of the experimental platforms and VPNs used
in the experiments can be found in Table 5.1. Details of the precise versions of the
browsers we tested are given in Table 5.2.
We chose to examine the five most widely used desktop browsers according to
netmarketshare.com4, namely Chrome, Firefox, Edge, Safari and Opera. Although
Internet Explorer is the second most widely used browser, we excluded it from the study
because it does not support WebRTC and so is not affected by the leaks discussed in
this chapter. Moreover, it has been replaced by Edge as the default browser in Windows.
Since Chrome, Firefox and Opera are available on Windows and macOS, we tested
these three browsers on both operating systems.
1https://github.com/diafygi/webrtc-ips [accessed on 17/04/2019]
2Windows 10.0.14393 (Build 14393)
3macOS 10.12.4 (16E195)
4https://www.netmarketshare.com/browser-market-share.aspx [accessed on 14/05/2017]
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Table 5.1: VPN program versions
VPN / Specs Windows MacOS URL
HMA! 3.4.6.1 2.2.7.0 https://hidemyass.com
ZenMate 3.4.7.17 1.5.4 https://zenmate.com
ExpressVPN 6.0.9 6.3.3 https://expressvpn.com
VyprVPN 2.9.6.7227 2.14.0.5485 https://goldenfrog.com/vyprvpn
TorGuard 0.3.69 0.3.69 https://torguard.net







Most of the tested VPN programs provide means for the users to modify certain
VPN configurations, for example, to switch from one VPN protocol (e.g. L2TP) to
another (e.g. PPTP). We found that in some cases this also affects which IP addresses
are leaked. This seems likely to be because of the VPN server configuration rather than
the protocol itself. Nevertheless, this fact is important to recognize and so we indicate
in our results summary below the VPN programs that exhibited such differences (see
Table 5.3 for details of the tested VPN configurations).
5.5 Details of Experiments
To perform the experiments, a website (https://fingerprintable.org/webrtcleaks)
was specially established. The web page contains JavaScript that, when executed in a
client browser, fetches all the IP addresses it can retrieve using WebRTC; the retrieved
IP addresses (if any) are then displayed on the page (see Figure 5.1). When using it
for the tests, the visiting device used either the Windows ipconfig command in the
command prompt, or ifconfig in macOS terminal to identify the types of address
displayed on the page.
51
5.5. Details of Experiments 5. IP Address Compromise through Browser Fingerprinting
Figure 5.1: WebRTC leak detector
We deployed all five of the chosen VPN programs with each of the eight selected
browser-OS combinations, giving a total of 40 test cases. In each case, we caused the
client to visit the test page on the specially established website, and documented the IP
address(es) displayed. For each of the 40 (VPN, OS, browser) combinations, we visited
the test page using all the protocols/configurations supported by the VPN to detect any
differences in leaked IP addresses, i.e. for each of the 40 test cases we made between one
and five tests (for full details see Table 5.3), giving a total of 116 tests. For example,
for each browser-OS combination we visited the test page using VyprVPN a number of
times, once using L2TP/IPsec once using PPTP, and so on.
Table 5.3: Tested VPN program configurations





























The tested VPN services provide access to VPN servers in a range of countries.
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However, in a series of informal tests we found no difference in the set of leaked IP
addresses when connecting to VPN servers for the same service in different countries.
5.6 Results and Analysis
Tables 5.4 and 5.5 summarize the experimental results for Windows and macOS,
respectively. Listed in the tables are the types of IP addresses leaked in each test
environment. The VPN protocols are also given in the cases where the choice of protocol
made a difference to the set of leaked IP addresses. It is worth noting that tests on
macOS while deploying a VPN did not reveal a client private IPv4 address, public IPv6
address or ULA.
Table 5.4: Results of experiments on Windows
VPN / Browser Chrome Firefox Edge Opera
Without VPN pvt. IPv4
IPv6


















ExpressVPN (all protocols) VPN IPv4
temp. IPv6






VyprVPN (Chameleon & OpenVPN) VPN IPv4
temp. IPv6









TorGuard (OpenVPN) VPN IPv4 VPN IPv4 pvt. IPv4
VPN IPv4
VPN IPv4
TorGuard (OpenConnect) VPN IPv4 VPN IPv4 no leak VPN IPv4
IPv6 = public IPv6 address; temp. IPv6 = public temporary IPv6 address; ULA = unique local address;
VPN IPv4 = private IP address assigned by VPN server; pvt. IPv4 = private IPv4 address assigned by
LAN.
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Table 5.5: Results of experiments on macOS
VPN / Browser Chrome Firefox Safari Opera
Without VPN pvt. IPv4
IPv6
pvt. IPv4 no leak pvt. IPv4
IPv6
HMA! (PPTP) VPN IPv4 VPN IPv4 no leak VPN IPv4
HMA! (OpenVPN) VPN IPv4
temp. IPv6




VPN IPv4 no leak VPN IPv4
temp. IPv6
ExpressVPN (OpenVPN) VPN IPv4
temp. IPv6
VPN IPv4 no leak VPN IPv4
temp. IPv6
ExpressVPN (L2TP/IPsec) VPN IPv4 VPN IPv4 no leak VPN IPv4
VyprVPN (Chameleon & OpenVPN) VPN IPv4 VPN IPv4 no leak VPN IPv4
VyprVPN (L2TP/IPsec) no leak no leak no leak no leak
TorGuard (all protocols) VPN IPv4 VPN IPv4 no leak VPN IPv4
temp. IPv6 = public temporary IPv6 address; VPN IPv4 = private IP address assigned by VPN server;
pvt. IPv4 = private IPv4 address assigned by LAN.
5.6.1 VPNs
The choice of VPN service had a significant effect on the number and type of IP addresses
leaked. In some cases, using one VPN protocol (e.g. L2TP/IPsec) in a VPN program
leaked a different number of addresses than another protocol in the same application.
We observed no differences in address leakage when switching between the TCP and
UDP network protocols, where such options were available. However, when testing
different VPN programs, variations in the sets of leaked IP addresses were observed
even when the same protocol was in use. We therefore concluded that these differences
can be attributed to how the VPN service is configured to handle the connection when
using particular protocols.
As can be seen from the tables, TorGuard proved to be the least privacy-compromising
VPN service. In all test cases, it revealed none of the client’s public IP addresses. At
the other extreme, VyprVPN and ExpressVPN did not prevent any of the WebRTC
leaks.
5.6.2 Browsers
Safari revealed no IP addresses regardless of which VPN was in use. It is important to
note that at the time of the study Safari did not fully support WebRTC, as revealed
by the (WebKit) specifications status page5. However, with the release of Safari 12 in
2018, WebRTC is now fully supported. We re-tested the new version without a VPN
service and it still did not reveal any IP addresses; this finding has been confirmed by
5https://webkit.org/status/ [accessed on 14/05/2017]
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Hazhirpasand and Ghafari [33]. By contrast, Edge revealed four of the five IP addresses
discussed in this chapter (only the temporary IPv6 address was not leaked). Edge was
the only browser to reveal the public IPv6 address(es) and ULA(s). This makes it
the most privacy-damaging browser. This might be because at the time of the study
(April 2017)6 Edge was the only browser that supported ORTC (Object Real-Time
Communications)7, the next generation WebRTC API.
Opera and Chrome were identical in terms of the number and type of leaked
addresses. This is likely because both are based on Google’s open-source browser
project, Chromium8. In all the individual tests that resulted in IP address leakage,
they both revealed the temporary IPv6 address as well as either the local private IP
address or the VPN-assigned private IP address. Somewhat different behaviour was
exhibited by Firefox, which in most cases revealed either the local private IP address or
the VPN-assigned private IP address; in some cases it did not reveal any addresses.
Firefox was the least privacy-damaging of the Windows-based browsers and Edge the
most. In macOS, Safari revealed no IP addresses and so it is the least privacy-damaging.
Chrome and Opera were the most privacy-damaging macOS browsers.
5.7 Countermeasures
The main lesson from the experiments described in this study is that users concerned
about IP address leaks should select their browser and VPN service with care, perhaps
using the https://fingerprintable.org/webcrtleaks site to check the properties
of the chosen combination. Over and above this, users interested in maintaining their
privacy by preventing WebRTC leaks can perform one or more of the countermeasures
discussed in Chapter 7.
It is worth noting that disabling JavaScript or WebRTC itself would prevent WebRTC
leaks, but would also disable many features and functionality of modern websites. Most
users are likely to find this an unacceptably high cost for the privacy benefit they would
receive, in the same way that whilst disabling cookies has significant privacy benefits,
the usability impact is too great to make it a widely used protection measure.
5.8 Disclosure
We contacted all five of the VPN service providers tested in this study and provided them
with our results. We were only received a response from ExpressVPN, who informed
6Still true as of April 2019.
7https://ortc.org/faq [accessed on 17/4/2019]
8http://www.chromium.org/blink/developer-faq [accessed on 14/05/2017]
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us that they were working on resolving the problem. They subsequently provided us
with the beta version of an upgraded client which, when tested, no longer leaked IP
addresses.
5.9 Summary
We performed experiments with the five most widely used WebRTC-enabled browsers,
i.e. Chrome, Firefox, Opera, Edge and Safari. We tested each of them with five widely
used commercial VPN services in order to discover which client IP addresses can be
revealed. Our experiments employed a specially established website which downloaded
a slightly modified version of publicly available JavaScript to the client under test. The
script fetches IP addresses made available via the browser WebRTC functionality. In
most cases, at least one of the client IP addresses was leaked. Edge was the most
seriously affected by WebRTC leaks, whereas Safari leaked no addresses at all. Our
experiments revealed that the number and type of leaked IP addresses are affected by
the choice of browser as well as the VPN service and program settings. We concluded the






This chapter contributes to the goal of increasing end-user awareness about browsing
fingerprinting. We describe FingerprintAlert, a Chrome browser extension that uses
a novel approach to detect (and optionally block) browser fingerprinting. We discuss
several anti-fingerprinting browser extensions in 7.3.2.
Commonly used browsers such as Chrome, Edge and Internet Explorer include very
little functionality to help mitigate fingerprinting, alert the user to its occurrence, or
even provide information about it in user help documents. Therefore, in order to help
resist and raise awareness of browser fingerprinting, we developed a browser extension
that alerts users whenever a visited website attempts to fingerprint their browser; users
can also opt to enable a fingerprinting blocking feature. The development of this
extension was developed in parallel with performing the study described in Chapter 3.
The extension uses the same set of 17 attribute values to detect browser fingerprinting
as were used in that study.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.2 provides a brief
overview of the FingerprintAlert extension. In Section 6.3, we discuss its blocking
feature. Section 6.4 provides details of its operation. In Section 6.5 we review its
strengths and shortcomings. Section 6.6 describes some of the challenges that might
limit its effectiveness. We describe its potential role in improving the awareness of users
about browser fingerprinting in Section 6.7. We conclude the chapter with a summary
in Section 6.8.
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6.2 Overview
As part of the research described in Chapter 3, we developed FingerprintAlert1,2, a
browser extension usable with both Windows and macOS. It was initially developed to
work on Chrome; however we later migrated it to also work with Firefox.
Based on the preliminary crawling described in 3.5.3, the extension detects possible
browser fingerprinting by looking for the transmission of the values of the same set
of 17 attributes as described in Chapter 3. That is, FingerprintAlert checks for the
presence of the values these attributes take for the browser and host platform on which
the extension is being run. It is activated whenever a web page is loaded, and checks
whether any of these 17 attribute values are being relayed back to a web server. To the
author’s knowledge, this method of fingerprinting detection has not previously proposed
in the literature.
If the extension detects such activity, it displays an alert that includes both the
sending and receiving URLs (see Figure 6.1 for an example alert message). The extension
also provides a detailed report of detected activities, including data relayed and the
corresponding destination(s) (see Figure 6.2 for an example). Finally, the extension
offers a user-selectable option to automatically block detected fingerprinting attempts.
If selected, an HTTP message including any of the monitored attributes will be blocked
from being relayed back to a remote server.
Figure 6.1: An example of a FingerprintAlert warning
6.3 Blocking
Websites typically send collected data in a series of HTTP messages, and if the blocking
feature is activated FingerprintAlert blocks all HTTP messages that contain at least
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Figure 6.2: Example report produced by FingerprintAlert
of the 17 selected attribute values, since the experiments reported in Chapter 3 suggest
that these attributes are typically transmitted in the same HTTP message as a large
number of other fingerprinting attributes, which are also blocked as a result. We verified
that the extension successfully blocked the messages by setting up an HTTP proxy
server (Burp Suite Scanner3) that allowed us to monitor raw traffic between the browser
and destination web servers.
As with any extension that interferes with browser behaviour, the blocking feature
of FingerprintAlert might cause unexpected results or even break some websites. To
ensure it does not cause significant usability issues, we tested it on the 50 most visited
websites from the list used in the Chapter 3 experiments. We enabled the blocking
feature, and spent around two minutes on each website performing actions such as
signing up, logging in and clicking on links. During the tests we did not observe any
unexpected behaviour or errors except for minor glitches on two websites (e.g. unable
to load support chat window). Nonetheless, in the unlikely event that the extension
damages a user’s experience at a website, the blocking option or the notifications option
can easily be disabled. The extension will continue to record detected fingerprinting
attempts even if both blocking and notifications are disabled.
3This is a tool for testing web application security. https://portswigger.net/burp
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6.4 Details of Operation
6.4.1 Overview
The extension is made up of two main components. The first component (see 6.4.3)
consists of three pieces of JavaScript code that implement the functionality of the
extension. The second component (see 6.4.2) is the interface, that is rendered using
HTML, CSS and images. The user interface component incorporates three HTML files,
Figure 6.3: A partial browser screenshot showing the Main pop-up user interface
the pop-up user interface (see Figures 6.3 and 6.4), the fingerprinting detection report
(see Figure 6.2) and the help page.
6.4.2 User Interface Component
The pop-up user interface consists of two pages, between which a user can switch by
clicking on one of the top tabs. The first tab (i.e. Main — see Figure 6.3) displays the
number of blocked fingerprinting attempts. The second tab (i.e. Configuration — see
Figure 6.4) contains the following five options.
• The Notifications option switch (top left in Figure 6.4) is enabled by default
and causes the extension to display in-browser alerts whenever a fingerprinting
attempt is detected. The user can slide the switch to the left to disable these
alerts.
• The Block Fingerprinting option switch (top right in Figure 6.4) is disabled
by default and, if enabled, causes the extension to block detected fingerprinting
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attempts. The user can slide the switch to the right to enable it.
• The Fingerprinting Report button (centre in Figure 6.4) opens a new page
that contains details of detected fingerprinting attempts.
• The Reset button (bottom left in Figure 6.4) deletes all data collected by the
extension and restores all options to their defaults.
• The Help button (bottom right in Figure 6.4) opens a page that serves as the
extension’s user manual.
Figure 6.4: Partial browser screenshot showing the Configuration user interface
6.4.3 Functional Component
The three scripts making up the functional component are listed below along with a
high-level description of their functions.
• background.js is the main script. It extracts the 17 browser attribute values for
the client, and then monitors traffic between the client browser and remote web
servers for the presence of any of these values. If the blocking option (see top
right of Figure 6.4) is enabled, the script prevents the browser transmitting any
HTTP message that contains one or more of of the attribute values.
• popup.js executes the user commands entered via the pop-up user interface.
• buildmap.js constructs reports detailing detected fingerprinting attempts.
The FingerprintAlert scripts can be found in the GitHub open repositories4.
4https://github.com/fingerprintable/FingerprintAlert
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6.4.4 Installation and Use
There are two versions of FingerprintAlert, one compatible with Chrome and the other
with Firefox. They can be downloaded and installed by visiting the corresponding
Chrome and Firefox official browser extension page5,6.
After installation, the extension will operate immediately. Every time the browser
is opened (or the extension re-installed), the extension will extract the values of the 17
browser attributes. Examples of extracted attribute values can be found in Table 3.4.
It will then monitor all information transmitted between the client browser and any
web server, looking for exact string matches with the 17 attribute values.
The extension monitors all outgoing traffic from the browser to a web server. If
the notifications option is enabled, it will notify the user via an alert message (see
Figure 6.1) whenever an HTTP message is discovered to contain one or more of the
17 attribute values. In parallel, if the blocking option is enabled, the transmission of
any messages found to contain one or more of the 17 values will be blocked; the two
options work independently. The extension will collect data for its reporting functions
regardless of the options settings.
6.5 Review
6.5.1 Strengths
Despite the fact that FingerprintAlert only detects 17 attributes, these attributes are
typically transmitted alongside other attributes which are also detected/blocked, given
that they are in the same HTTP message. The extension can be used in conjunction
with other anti-fingerprinting browser extensions (see 7.3.2) since it uses a different
approach to detection and blocking.
6.5.2 Shortcomings
Of course, if a fingerprinting website does not collect any of the 17 attributes that
FingerprintAlert searches for, then it will give a false negative. Similarly, if the website
encodes the collected information in some way, i.e. so that a simple string search will
fail, then again a false negative will result.
In its default setting, i.e. with blocking disabled, FingerprintAlert has no effect on
the appearance and functionality of websites. However, as discussed in 6.3, if blocking
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6.6 Challenges
Detecting novel approaches to fingerprinting is an obstacle that faces all privacy exten-
sions (see 7.2.2). A major challenge facing the approach adopted by FingerprintAlert is
that websites could choose to conceal transmitted attributes, e.g. using encryption, or
use attributes that are not publicly known. Additionally, it is difficult to automatically
detect all fingerprinting attribute values, as they may be similar to other data or have
no specific set of values. On the other hand, the script analysis approach adopted widely
by other anti-fingerprinting extensions, has its own issues. In particular detecting and
examining scripts executed on websites is likely to be hindered by changes in code,
syntax and execution.
6.7 Awareness
The main purpose of FingerprintAlert is to make users aware of fingerprinting attempts
as they happen and the identity of domains collecting the fingerprinting data, and as a
result increase their awareness of how widespread such practices are. The results of our
study could also help in developing new tools designed to thwart fingerprinting.
If user privacy is to be preserved on the web, it is also important that fingerprinting
technology is made user-controllable, so that users can limit the degree to which they
are tracked. FingerprintAlert helps contribute to this by providing users with the option
to block browser fingerprinting.
6.8 Summary
In this chapter we described FingerprintAlert, a freely available browser extension that
detects fingerprinting attempts by visited websites. It also blocks detected attempts
if the user enabled the option. Furthermore, it maintains a user-accessible record
of detected fingerprinting attempts. This record includes the visited website, the
information collected, the recipient web domain for the collected information and the
HTTP method used. The extension is designed to make browser users aware of the






In this chapter we focus on means of controlling browser fingerprinting. We look at
measures that can be taken by both end-users and browser vendors. We examine
previously proposed guidelines for browser vendors and formulate a comprehensive
set of recommendations for browser vendors to give users greater control over browser
fingerprinting. In a slightly different direction, we also propose a browser identifier that
could serve as a standardized, and controllable, alternative to browser fingerprinting.
The fact that tracking can so readily be performed using browser fingerprinting is
potentially a major threat to the privacy of web users, and as noted above it is one over
which users currently have no control. Whilst there are uses of browser fingerprinting
not directly relating to tracking, the lack of user control combined with the serious
privacy threat suggests that means of limiting its effectiveness, i.e. what we refer to
here as fingerprinting countermeasures, are of potentially huge importance, motivating
the work described in this chapter.
Fingerprinting countermeasures can be divided into two categories, depending on
whether they are directly implementable by the user regardless of the browser, or
whether they require support from the browser vendor. In the remainder of this
chapter we provide a comprehensive and systematic review of possible fingerprinting
countermeasures. This is significant for a number of reasons. First, some of these
techniques, whilst apparently known, have not previously been described in the academic
literature. Second, this review enables us to compare their effectiveness (and their
limitations) and also consider how best such countermeasures could be implemented,
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from the perspectives of both the user and the browser vendor. Third, it enables us to
identify areas where further research is urgently needed.
Finally, given that fingerprint-based tracking is so privacy intrusive (and uncontrol-
lable), we also consider a way in which the major fingerprinters might be encouraged
to abandon the practice. We, possibly controversially, propose that browsers should
support a new type of website-accessible identifier, referred to as a Unique Browser
Identifier, which would enable a level of user-controllable tracking without involving the
collection of other user and browser data. This could make browser vendors willing to
change behaviour to make fingerprinting difficult, leading to its use becoming redundant
and (potentially) prevented. The possible operation of this identifier, and its advantages
and disadvantages, are discussed.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 7.2, a general
overview of approaches to limiting fingerprinting is provided. Sections 7.3 and 7.4 provide
detailed descriptions of all known user-based and browser-based anti-fingerprinting
measures, respectively. In Section 7.5, we discuss a browser identifier-based proposal
that aims at making browser fingerprinting redundant. Building on the previous sections,
in Section 7.6 we review the degree to which browser fingerprinting can be controlled
using current technology and consider ways in which greater control can be exercised in
the future. The summary in Section 7.7 concludes the chapter.
7.2 Limiting Browser Fingerprinting
7.2.1 General Approaches
Most techniques aimed at limiting the effectiveness of fingerprinting either involve user-
enabled options such as installing extensions, or operate via browsers that incorporate
anti-fingerprinting features. We discuss these two general classes of countermeasures in
greater detail in Sections 7.3 and 7.4 below.
A number of authors have proposed extensions that could help counter fingerprinting.
Examples include FP-Block [80], Blink [43] and FingerprintAlert (see Chapter 6).
There are also widely discussed extensions of this type that do not seem to have any
corresponding published research, such as CanvasBlocker1 and Stop Fingerprinting2.
Luangmaneerote et al. [49] surveyed several of the more widely discussed fingerprinting
countermeasures. They concluded that no single countermeasure can protect against
all known fingerprinting methods, and that such countermeasures are likely to both
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methods. In this chapter, we do not attempt to evaluate or enumerate individual anti-
fingerprinting extensions; instead our goal is to consider the possible general approaches
and in each case examine its effectiveness.
As far as browser-incorporated anti-fingerprinting techniques are concerned, a
number of documents provide recommendations and guidelines to browser vendors
aimed at limiting the effectiveness of fingerprinting, including RFC 6973 [13], a W3C
Note [17], Eckersley [18], and Nikiforakis et al. [61]. However, the detailed technical
aspects of such recommendations are outside the scope of this study, which is intended
to provide a roadmap for policymakers, developers, browser vendors and interested
general web users who wish to help control browser fingerprinting.
7.2.2 Challenges
A number of proposed browser fingerprinting countermeasures involve adding features
to the browser, typically in the form of a browser extension. However, approaches of
this type have serious limitations [49] and might even lead to effects opposite to those
intended (see Section 7.3.3). By contrast, and as discussed in greater detail in Section
7.4, browser vendors could potentially control fingerprinting very effectively by making
modifications to the way browsers operate. To help substantiate these claims, we next
consider some of the main challenges in controlling browser fingerprinting.
Misuse of Browser Features
One major challenge in controlling fingerprinting is that information useful for finger-
printing can be obtained from “regular” web interactions, including website-originated
browser scripts that access standardized APIs. That is, preventing fingerprinting might
necessitate stopping, or restricting, such interactions, scripts and the APIs they access,
which will almost certainly damage the user’s browsing experience. For example, canvas
fingerprinting makes use of the Canvas API (see Chapter 2), and simply blocking this
API would result in browsers being unable to render images that could be critical to
use of a web page.
Detection
Unlike tracking via cookies, that can be detected by the presence of cookies stored on user
device, there are no unambiguous methods of detecting browser fingerprinting. Moreover,
it can be performed passively (see Chapter 2) and is thus virtually undetectable (except,
perhaps, by second order effects, such as receipt of targeted advertising). As discussed in
Chapter 2, active fingerprinting can also be very hard to detect, as it can take advantage
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of almost any existing web API. The same applies almost certainly to any future new
APIs, unless new APIs are developed with built-in resistance to fingerprinting.
7.3 User-based Countermeasures
We now describe and analyze a variety of ways in which users can reduce the effectiveness
of browser fingerprinting. We also consider the main challenges to user-based approaches,
in particular observing that none of these techniques prevent fingerprinting — indeed,
some may even make it more effective.
7.3.1 Browser Choice and Configuration
Browsers vary in their susceptibility to fingerprinting — see Chapter 4. These variations
arise for a variety of reasons, including that some browsers, such as Firefox, have (possibly
user-selectable) features that are designed to help resist fingerprinting. Moreover, as
described by Boda et al. [10], some browser configuration options, such as disabling
JavaScript, can affect fingerprinting. That is, a user’s choice of browser and configuration
options can change the effectiveness of fingerprinting. Finally, selecting a browser and
version that is used by many users is also likely to help in making the browser a little
less fingerprintable3.
Before proceeding it is important to mention the Tor browser4, which is specifically
designed to be privacy-protecting; hence selecting Tor could be seen as a potentially
effective user-based countermeasure. Unlike several widely-used browsers, the Tor
browser includes by default a range of features intended to counter fingerprinting.
These include using a fixed set of system colours, disabling plugins by default, limiting
the number of fonts a document is allowed to load, and disallowing read access to
canvas-rendered images unless express permission is granted by the user5.
However, use of the Tor browser has a number of serious practical drawbacks including
a seriously compromised browsing experience, one aspect of which is a slow browsing
speed; there are also relatively few users (less than 1% of web users employ the Tor
browser6) which might itself make fingerprinting possible because of the fingerprintability
paradox (see 7.3.3). Tor also possesses other serious usability issues: it breaks some
websites, some websites opt to block Tor clients, and changes in IP address negatively
3https://panopticlick.eff.org/self-defense
4The Tor browser is a modified version of Firefox that has enhanced security and privacy features,
https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser
5https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/design [accessed on 13/02/2019].
6Estimated by comparing the number of Tor browser clients during January 2019 as reported
on https://metrics.torproject.org with the total number of web users reported on http://www.
internetlivestats.com/internet-users.
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affect the localized web browsing experience. Another example of a usability issue arises
when Tor advises a user against maximizing the browser window via an in-browser
notification. This is intended to keep the window at the default size and thereby the
same size as other Tor users, hence preventing websites from learning the device’s display
size. Whilst this reduces browser fingerprintability, it will clearly have a negative effect
on the user experience.
More generally, making attributes the same across multiple browser instances and
hence reducing their uniqueness would make fingerprinting more difficult. However, it
is also likely to damage the user experience by preventing a website tailoring its site
to match the characteristics of the user device [66]. These serious disadvantages mean
that the Tor browser is unlikely ever to be widely adopted, and hence cannot be seen
as a generally applicable means of controlling fingerprinting.
7.3.2 Browser Extensions
Apart from the fundamental choice of browser, the main option for users wishing to
limit the effectiveness of browser fingerprinting is to install one or more special-purpose
browser extensions. As noted in Section 7.2.1, a number of such extensions exist, and
we now consider these extensions in greater detail.
We were unable to find any detailed and generally applicable evidence regarding the
relative effectiveness of the existing extensions; however they all seem to share common
weaknesses. The limited effectiveness of some individual extensions has been evaluated
in controlled environments, including by Nikiforakis et al. [62] and Luangmaneerote
et al. [49]. It seems unlikely that a single extension is able to completely prevent
fingerprinting, given the multiplicity of fingerprinting approaches, potentially including
methods not in the public domain. Furthermore, there is no known method of learning
whether extensions that counter certain fingerprinting techniques are in fact able to
prevent real-world fingerprinting. This is especially apparent given that it is not always
possible to detect when fingerprinting is occurring in the first place [1].
We also observe that some extensions not specifically designed for the purpose can
nonetheless reduce the effectiveness of fingerprinting, as a by-product of their intended
functionality. One such example is NoScript7, that controls which scripts deployed by
a visited website are allowed to run on the browser; depending on its configuration it
might prevent execution of scripts used for browser fingerprinting. However, in this
study we only consider purpose-built anti-fingerprinting extensions.
We next briefly review the three main techniques employed by the anti-fingerprinting
browser extensions of which we are aware. We consider the limitations they all share in
7https://noscript.net
68
7.3. User-based Countermeasures 7. Controlling Browser Fingerprinting
Section 7.3.3 below.
• Script Blocking: this works by blocking suspected fingerprinting scripts. Scripts
are identified as suspect either via a blacklist of script providers and/or by their
inclusion of known fingerprinting code. One example of an extension adopting the
script blocking approach is Privacy Badger8, developed by the Electronic Frontier
Foundation. It detects canvas fingerprinting and prevents third-party scripts that
deploy it from executing.
• Attribute Spoofing: extensions that use this technique attempt to prevent
fingerprinting by constantly spoofing browser/platform attributes. Examples of
extensions using this approach include: PriVaricator (due to Nikiforakis et al.
[60]), FPRrandom (due to Laperdrix et al. [42]), FPGuard (due to FaizKhademi
et al. [22]) and an unnamed extension due to Fiore et al. [27]. FP-Block (due to
Torres et al. [80]), also fabricates some browser attributes, but it also blocks some
scripts. That is, it employs both script blocking and attribute spoofing.
• Data Blocking: this involves blocking the retrieval of attributes that might be
used for fingerprinting from the browser. This approach is used by FingerprintAlert
(see Chapter 6).
7.3.3 Limitations
The main disadvantage of user-based countermeasures is that they all depend on
manipulating or blocking data sent by the browser to remote web servers. This gives
rise to two major limitations, which we now discuss.
• Compromised Browsing Experience: many browser-based countermeasures
compromise the browsing experience in some way [49]. This is especially true
when such countermeasures block certain scripts or spoof properties that may be
important for the functionality of a visited website. There is also the possibility
of a false positive, i.e. an incorrectly detected fingerprinting attempt, breaking
some “innocent” websites.
• Fingerprintability Paradox: this phenomenon has been widely discussed —
see, for example, Eckersley [18], Torres et al. [80], and Gulya´s and Some´ [31]. The
term captures the fact that measures taken to reduce browser fingerprintability
can unintentionally create a new source of fingerprinting. A simple example arises
where the installation of an anti-fingerprinting browser extension that is only
8https://www.eff.org/privacybadger
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installed in a small number of devices can be detected by a web server. That
is, the presence of the extension is itself an attribute that can contribute to
fingerprinting. This is a special case of what to refer to as detection of defence,
where the deployment of a countermeasure can be detected and can be used to
contribute to fingerprinting [61, 77]. This problem is especially significant if the
number of users of the countermeasure is relatively small.
A related but distinct issue arises from the deployment of a browser extension
that spoofs browser attributes for anonymization purposes but as a result exhibits
a set of browser characteristics that is unrealistic or rare. This behaviour can
make a browser more identifiable. Further, Vastel et al. [85] argue that some
countermeasures potentially make browsers more fingerprintable since both spoofed
and correct browser attributes can be discovered, e.g. using two different APIs.
Finally, it has also been observed by Perry [65] that privacy-cautious users who
opt to enable the Do Not Track (DNT)9 option in their browsers increase their
fingerprintability surface by doing so. In fact, the DNT option is no longer officially
endorsed by the W3C [75]; while it is still supported by some browsers, Apple has
announced10 that version 12.1 of its Safari browser will drop support.
7.4 Browser-based Countermeasures
We next discuss the various countermeasures that could be implemented by browser
vendors, as well as the associated challenges.
7.4.1 Reducing the Fingerprinting Surface
Having browsers exhibit similar information wherever possible would help limit fin-
gerprinting [13, 17]. For example, as discussed in 2.3.1, the HTTP user agent header
field is an important source of information for browser fingerprinting since, as currently
implemented, it contains many browser and platform details, including full details of
the browser version and, in some mobile browsers, the mobile phone model. Restricting
the information included to only what is vital for the functioning of websites would
clearly help reduce its utility for fingerprinting, whilst not affecting its usefulness for
tailoring website content.
Currently, the specifics of API implementation are typically left to browser vendors,
9DNT is a standard browser feature that sends a request to websites that the browser user does not
wish to be tracked [75].
10https://developer.apple.com/documentation/safari_release_notes/safari_12_1_release_
notes [accessed on 13/02/2019]
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which increases their usefulness for fingerprinting by enabling one browser to be dis-
tinguished from another through minor implementation differences [58]. However, if
the standards included enough details to ensure these APIs are implemented in a way
that would make browsers indistinguishable, then this will in turn limit fingerprinting
effectiveness.
One of the methods used by some browsers (e.g. Firefox) to limit fingerprinting is
attribute spoofing (as used in anti-fingerprinting extensions, cf. 7.3.2). However, as
discussed in Section 7.3, attribute spoofing can seriously damage the user experience, and
may also have a computational cost. Thus, whilst attribute spoofing may be necessary
as a short-term expedient, in the longer term arranging for as much cross-browser
attribute uniformity as possible is clearly a preferable approach [66]. As a result, it is
likely that browsers that resort to spoofing are doing so as a temporary measure, as
achieving behavioural uniformity would require, a currently absent, consensus amongst
browser vendors.
In conclusion, and as recommended by RFC 6973 [13], it would be highly desirable
for browsers to minimize the information content of browser-retrievable attributes to
that needed to deliver the user experience, whilst also working to remove unnecessary
differences in browser behaviour, including the order and presence of HTTP fields. Such
changes could make a significant difference to the effectiveness of fingerprinting, with
no obvious disadvantages in terms of the delivery of web content.
7.4.2 Context-based API Access Control
If browsers could be designed to control access to certain APIs based on the context
of use, this would be very useful in controlling fingerprinting. For example, and as
demonstrated by the Fingerprintability test web page (see 5.5), the client platform
private IP address can be exposed via the WebRTC API. The specific feature of
WebRTC that reveals the IP address is intended for video chat purposes. Currently,
again as shown by Fingerprintability, this API can be accessed in many widely-used
browsers regardless of whether or not video conferencing is taking place (or even without
prompting the user). Hence (by some means) restricting access to the WebRTC API to
video chat sites would clearly be beneficial in limiting fingerprinting.
There are many other examples of APIs whose use could be limited with similar
benefits, such as access to processing and graphics hardware information through the
WebGL API11 in cases where it is not used to render any graphics. Analogously, since
tracking is mostly performed by third parties, it would be very helpful if third-party
11A web API that renders 2D and 3D graphics on supported browsers.
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scripts were prevented from accessing any API unless there is a clear reason for its use
by a party other than the visited website [66].
7.4.3 Deprecate/Limit Unnecessary APIs
There is a need for the set of standardized APIs to be revisited and pruned where
possible, since some APIs are apparently used almost exclusively by fingerprinters [66].
Of course, such APIs were not developed for fingerprinting purposes. Supporting this,
Snyder et al. [76] have shown that many APIs are not utilized by any of top 100,000
visited websites. Such lightly used APIs create avoidable fingerprinting opportunities.
Removing such APIs, or at least limiting their functionality, would therefore limit
fingerprinting with minimal impact on the user experience. Two examples of such APIs
are as follows.
• As noted by Olejnik et al. [64], the battery API is almost solely used for finger-
printing purposes. This API allows websites to detect the battery level of the
client’s device and optionally adjust website content to reduce battery-draining
features if low battery levels are detected [41]. Safari never supported this API
while Firefox did support it for a while but deprecated it in 2017 (possibly because
of privacy issues). This move was followed by several other browser vendors. At
the time of writing, Chrome is the only one of the top five browsers that still
supports this API.
• An example of an API with features which seem primarily useful for fingerprinting
is provided by the Canvas API, that enables a website to specify an image in
code form (reducing data transfer requirements). Mowery and Shacham [56]
showed that browsers and platforms vary in how they render canvas images. This
is made valuable for fingerprinting by an API feature that allows a website to
retrieve the canvas-rendered image. Disabling this latter feature would remove
the fingerprinting function without preventing use of the API for its intended
purpose.
7.4.4 Alerts and Prompts
As noted by Doty [17] and Fette and Melnikov [13], it would enhance user control if users
were made aware whenever a browser detects behaviour which suggests fingerprinting is
being performed. In addition, it would also be helpful if users could be given the means
to control such behaviour. Of course, as we have discussed above, reliably detecting
fingerprinting is a hard problem. However, it might be possible to detect when a website
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is collecting information which is apparently unrelated to the information being served
to the user. This could, perhaps, involve the use of machine learning techniques.
Examples of possible controls that could be given to users when a website is detected
collecting fingerprintable data include:
• blocking the data collection;
• anonymizing the collectable data by spoofing or removing unique values;
• allowing users to select what data can be collected by a visited website.
Even if it is not possible to control the potential fingerprinting, it would help if users
could be notified when such activity, e.g. involving the Canvas API, is detected. To a
limited, and varying, extent this is implemented in both the Safari and Tor browsers.
However, browser vendors need to be wary of warning fatigue [66], as over-frequent alerts
might cause users to pay less attention to prompts and click on them without considering
their content. Usefully, the number of times a user is prompted could be reduced if
appropriate options were made available to users, such as enabling/disabling prompts,
blacklisting, and automatically blocking certain third-party interactions. Moreover,
prompts could be reduced if users were prompted only when suspicious behaviour is
detected. An example of such suspicious behaviour would be a website that attempts
to retrieve a canvas-rendered image while the image itself cannot be seen by the user
because it is invisible or too small.
In a small investigation we found that none of the top four desktop browsers12
(i.e. Chrome, Internet Explorer, Firefox and Edge) alert users when a visited website
performs actions typical of fingerprinters, nor do they appear to incorporate any specific
measures to prevent fingerprinting13. By contrast, as discussed in 7.3.1, the Tor browser
protects against canvas fingerprinting by default as it prompts users before allowing the
retrieval of canvas-rendered images by a visited website.
7.4.5 Reduction in API accuracy
Several authors (e.g. Eckersley [18] and Olejnik at al. [63]) have suggested using a
reduction in the accuracy and level of detail provided by a browser in order to help
counter fingerprinting. As discussed in 7.4.1, reducing the level of detail in the HTTP
header would significantly help in limiting fingerprinting. The reporting of constantly
12The list of the most widely-used browsers was retrieved from https://www.netmarketshare.com/
browser-market-share.aspx [accessed on 06/08/2018].
13Firefox has a small set of configurable anti-fingerprinting settings; however, these are only likely to
be employed by technically aware users.
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varying values, such as time and battery level could also be made less accurate to help
prevent fingerprinting.
A further example of this type is provided by location information. Currently, all
widely-used browsers prompt users to give permission if a website tries to access the
location of the user. However, while the currently high level of accuracy obtainable (e.g.
up to 4–5 metres) is likely to be necessary for applications such as satellite navigation,
the need for such accuracy for most cases is arguable at best. Reducing the level of
accuracy of the data provided, e.g. by enhancing the API to allow two or more levels of
accuracy, could help limit fingerprinting. In addition to the prompt for user permission
to access location information implemented by many browsers, the browser could also
warn the user if a website is requesting highly-accurate location information.
7.4.6 Secure Data Handling
As described in 3.8.4, potentially privacy-sensitive fingerprinting data is often retrieved
from a browser in plaintext via HTTP. Browsers could usefully enforce the use of
HTTPS for such information transfers, as advised in RFC 6973 [13]. Currently, Chrome
is the only browser that forces websites to use HTTPS in order to access the user
location through the Geolocation API14. However, this restriction is not extended to
other APIs.
Currently, several browsers such as Firefox warn users if they are visiting a website
not using HTTPS, and prompt users to deny transmission if they are about to submit
information that does not use it. However, no warnings and almost no restrictions are
in place if a script from a third-party website retrieves information via HTTP. This
shortcoming clearly merits consideration by browser vendors.
7.4.7 Challenges
Perhaps the main challenge for implementing browser-based countermeasures is to
make browsers, wherever possible, behave indistinguishably to websites while keeping
retrievable information to a minimum. Achieving the necessary agreement amongst
competing vendor providers is likely to be difficult without enforcement by regulatory
or standard bodies.
Another obvious challenge is ensuring changes implemented by browser vendors
have minimal negative impact on the browsing experience of users. Achieving this is
non-trivial given that, as discussed earlier, changes could include restricting APIs as
well as occasionally prompting users.
14https://www.w3schools.com/html/html5_geolocation.asp [accessed on 18/02/2019]
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Finally, some browser vendors might not wish to limit fingerprinting given that their
parent companies apparently depend on it for their own services, such as providing web
analytics and personalized online advertising.
7.5 Making Browser Fingerprinting Unnecessary?
7.5.1 A Different Approach
As noted briefly above, whilst browser vendors are in a strong position to decide how
effective browser fingerprinting is, some of the key players in this space, notably Google,
may be unlikely to take steps to limit it since, as shown by the study described in
Chapter 3, they also appear to play a major role in browser fingerprinting. That is,
there is clearly a desire by at least some key browser vendors to be able to track user
behaviour. Indeed, to some extent this is necessary to enable these vendors to continue
to support “free” (and highly valued) services, such as web search.
In this respect, it might be argued that trying to restrict cookies has been counter-
productive for user privacy; at least cookies are, to a high degree, user-controllable, i.e.
users can delete all cookies from time to time and thereby refresh their online identity.
Exerting usage control is much more difficult when browser fingerprinting is employed for
tracking, since as we have argued it is far less controllable and far more privacy-damaging
in that it retrieves a wide variety of information about a user’s platform and browser
configuration. That is, pressure to limit cookies may have encouraged trackers to adopt
browser fingerprinting, with an associated worsening of end-user privacy protection.
Apparently, five years ago Google intended to replace the use of cookies with some
form of browser-generated ID (confirmed by a Google official [11]). However, no further
information was ever made available. This apparently abandoned proposal suggests a
possible new, and apparently paradoxical, approach to limiting browser fingerprinting.
That is, if trackers can be offered a means of tracking browsers that is less privacy-
damaging than browser fingerprinting, then browser vendors might be more willing to
countenance adopting measures to reduce the effectiveness of fingerprinting.
Currently, operating systems such as Windows and Android support an advertising
ID [74]. This serves as a unique identifier for the device/user for locally installed
programs/apps to serve personalized ads. This ID can be reset, meaning that all
previous associations are removed. This suggests a similar scheme in which a novel
user-controllable ID is accessible by websites through browsers. This ID (which we call
the Unique Browser Identifier (UBI)) would be managed by the browser itself, rather
than the host operating system, since it is intended for use solely by the browser.
The main reason to introduce a browser-managed UBI is to provide a replacement
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for both cookies and browser fingerprinting for the purposes of tracking, e.g. for the
support of personalized advertising. That is, by providing a legitimate, simple and user-
controllable method of enabling tracking, the use of cookies and browser fingerprinting
for this purpose could be made redundant. Simultaneously with the introduction of
the UBI, measures would also need to be put in place to prevent trackers using both
the UBI and browser fingerprinting (hence damaging privacy even further). This could
be achieved by regulation and/or standardization, as well as by implementing the
recommendations given in Section 7.4. Apart from making fingerprinting for tracking
redundant, the UBI could also replace other existing uses of browser fingerprinting. In
particular it could serve as an additional layer of authentication.
7.5.2 Configuring Identifiers
To ensure that the introduction of the UBI gives the user the control that is currently
lacking with browser fingerprinting, browsers will need to enable users to limit access to
the UBI (and reset it). It could be advantageous for a browser to support more than one
UBI, for example one for personalization (e.g. for personalized advertising) and another
for authentication purposes (e.g. as a factor in multi-factor authentication). This would
allow the access settings for the various UBIs to be separately configurable. For example,
a user might choose to allow third parties to have access to a personalization UBI, e.g. as
used for personalized advertising, and might also choose to automatically reset this UBI
at fixed intervals (e.g. monthly). In parallel, an authentication UBI might be configured
to only be available under very restricted circumstances, e.g. only to the site visited
by the user and/or to a “login” web page and/or if the user gives explicit permission.
UBIs, depending on their type, might also be unique per website, as opposed to being
the same regardless of the retrieving party.
7.5.3 UBI and Cookies
It could be argued that the functionality of a UBI could just as easily be implemented
through the use of a special cookie. However, as we discuss below, there are a number
of reasons why the UBI offers desirable features not accessible through the simple use of
cookies. Of course the UBI would not replace cookies, as they serve as a general-purpose
means of adding state to HTTP, an otherwise stateless protocol.
One major difference between cookies and the proposed UBI is that the user has no
means of controlling how cookies are used; all a user can do is have them deleted. By
contrast, the UBI has a well-defined role and its use could be configured to meet user
privacy requirements. That is, by providing explicit browser support for the UBI, its
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use can be controlled much more precisely than would be the case for cookies.
To help enable transparency of use and make websites accountable for their actions,
browsers could usefully maintain a log of accesses to each type of UBI, e.g. including
access date/time and accessing URL, just as is the case for cookies. However, unlike the
case for cookies, it would also be helpful to log details of whether the requesting site is
a third-party site, while also identifying the first-party site whose website contained the
third-party link. Recording this additional information is made possible by implementing
the UBI as a distinct browser feature.
Browsers should also enforce the use of HTTPS for UBI transfers, i.e. preventing
access via HTTP. Currently, unless the appropriate flag is set, cookies can be transferred
via HTTP, and transferring the UBI unencrypted would clearly be a privacy risk. As
we discussed in Chapter 3, it is interesting to observe that browser fingerprinting
information is currently often transferred using HTTP.
Currently the expiry date of cookies is controlled by the server that created them,
whereas UBI expiry would ideally be user-controllable. Moreover, if a multi-UBI system
was implemented, UBIs would serve a range of purposes, and their behaviour and
handling could be managed individually.
7.5.4 Privacy Considerations
Ideally, the use and functioning of a UBI should be standardized by an official body
rather than being left to an initiative by a browser vendor. As mentioned in 7.5.1,
Google considered replacing the use of cookies with a browser generated ID. Had such
functionality been unilaterally added, perhaps with minimal user controls, it would
potentially have given Google even greater control over online personalized advertising,
to the detriment of user privacy, given that Google currently [19, 59] also owns the
largest shares of both online advertising and browser users.
It might be argued that potential sharing of a UBI amongst trackers might increase
privacy concerns. Analogously, concerns about sharing of browser fingerprinting IDs
have recently been expressed [23]. However, in the case of UBIs, this might be avoided
if the recommendations below and those in 7.5.1 and 7.5.3 are followed.
To help minimize the threat posed to user privacy, we propose that the following
rules governing UBIs should be enforced by the browser.
• UBI Access Control: users should have full control over the use of all UBIs.
This can be through prompts as well as enabling blacklisting/whitelisting of
websites. Usage control should include providing means to enable/disable UBI
access to third party websites. Denied websites could be provided with a dummy
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ID to prevent them learning that the user has denied them access.
• UBI Reset: like the existing advertising IDs, UBIs should be resettable, allowing
users to opt to be forgotten by all websites that possess any of the previous UBI(s).
• UBI Opacity: UBIs should be generated in a way that reveals no information
about its platform/client, nor linking with previously generated values.
7.6 Discussion
7.6.1 Browsers with Fingerprinting-Resisting Features
Some initial steps have been taken by certain browser vendors to tackle browser
fingerprinting. However, apart from the Tor browser, these steps remain small and
many browser vendors have not added any such features to their browsers. Firefox
calls its techniques of this type resistFingerprinting. Using the term “resist” seems
appropriate given that the measures certainly do not prevent it altogether. Firefox
version 62 incorporates four options that can be enabled to resist fingerprinting, although
some are disabled by default.
It is not clear what exactly they do, but apparently one of them reduces time-
reporting precision and another tackles one aspect of canvas fingerprinting. For reasons
that are unclear, Firefox has opted not to make these options available in the main
Options menu; instead, access is via the somewhat obscure advanced options, that are
only accessible by typing about:config in the address bar (see Figure 7.1).
Figure 7.1: Firefox anti-fingerprinting options
Apart from these limited measures in Firefox, only Safari and the Tor browser appear
to contain significant anti-fingerprinting features. Even in this case, only the latest
Safari version possesses such features. This leaves around 98%15 of web users without
15https://netmarketshare.com/browser-market-share.aspx [accessed 30/10/2018].
78
7.7. Summary 7. Controlling Browser Fingerprinting
any default anti-fingerprinting protection. The Safari and Tor browser implementations
of anti-fingerprinting measures differ, although both Safari and Tor are designed to
make all versions indistinguishable. It is important that other browsers follow similar
design considerations.
7.6.2 A Possible Role for Regulation
As discussed in 7.4, a number of steps could be taken by browser vendors to make
fingerprinting significantly less effective, including removing (or limiting) rarely used
APIs and reducing API accuracy. The main question is how to persuade browser vendors
to implement such steps. One possible route might involve some kind of regulation.
More than 92%16 of users use one of the five most widely used browsers, but trackers
and the domains they use are very numerous. It therefore seems reasonable to focus more
on controlling browser fingerprinting by regulating browsers rather than by regulating
websites. Moreover, browsers act as a kind of middle man between websites and users,
and can thus act as a type of privacy regulator [58]. However, it is important to note
that some browser vendors also make extensive use of browser fingerprinting, and are
thus likely to be reluctant to restrict it. Finally, despite the primary focus on browsers,
the regulation of websites remains an important possibility, especially given that it
appears that most tracking is performed by a limited number of third parties (see
Chapter 3).
7.7 Summary
Browser fingerprinting is increasingly being used for online tracking of users, and,
unlike the use of cookies, is almost impossible for users to control. This has a major
negative impact on online privacy. Despite the availability of a range of fingerprinting
countermeasures as well as some limited attempts by browser vendors to curb its
effectiveness, it remains largely uncontrolled. Third-party countermeasures have inherent
limitations and many browser vendors do not appear to have made significant efforts to
control it. This chapter provided a comprehensive and structured discussion of measures
to limit or control browser fingerprinting, covering both user-based and browser-based
techniques. It also discusses the limitations of these measures and the need for browser
vendor support in controlling fingerprinting. Further, a somewhat counterintuitive
possible new browser identifier is proposed which could make cookies and fingerprint-





Conclusions and Future Work
8.1 Conclusions
The work described in this thesis has been motivated by the growing privacy threat
posed by browser fingerprinting. Of course, addressing such a threat requires that we
understand in detail how it works and who is doing it. Chapters 2 to 5 of this thesis
describe work directed at learning more about the prevalence and nature of browser
fingerprinting. The rest of the thesis builds on the understanding derived from the
first chapters, and considers the question of giving users greater control over browser
fingerprinting. We next examine in greater detail the contributions in each of the
chapters of the thesis.
In Chapter 2 we reviewed browser fingerprinting and its related prior art. We
observed that, since users have no direct means of controlling it, in some ways browser
fingerprinting poses a higher risk to privacy than tracking via cookies. We also observed
that it is increasingly being used for online tracking of users even in the absence of a
persistent IP address or cookie.
In Chapter 3 we reviewed prior art that attempted to measure the prevalence of
browser fingerprinting. We explained how the variety of different fingerprinting detection
methods used in previous studies has given rise significantly varying results. In particular,
most previous studies have been based on detecting a very limited number of techniques
or scripts. We also described the results of a study showing that browser fingerprinting
is being conducted on a significantly larger scale than previously reported, involving the
transmission of large volumes of browser and device-specific data to trackers. We also
reported on the large number of fingerprinting attributes collected. As other authors
have described, browser fingerprinting has significant negative implications on user
privacy, and it is therefore important that the web user community is made aware of
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its prevalence and potential effectiveness. To this end, we developed FingerprintAlert,
used in the study and discussed in detail in Chapter 6.
In Chapter 4 we discussed an investigation of an aspect of browser fingerprinting
that has not previously been explored in the literature, namely the differences between
browsers in terms of the amount of information they reveal to executing scripts (and
hence to fingerprinting websites). For example, some mobile browsers reveal (for no
obvious reason) the specific phone model, and browsers differ widely in how they imple-
ment the WebRTC and Canvas APIs, both of key importance for browser fingerprinting.
It would therefore be highly desirable if all browsers asked for user permission before
rendering a canvas image, or at least disabled the option that allows servers to retrieve
details of the rendered image. At the time we performed our experiments, Safari would
appear to be the best choice in this respect on both mobile and desktop platforms.
Despite Chrome being the most widely used browser, it proved to be one of the most
fingerprintable.
In Chapter 5 we reported on experiments examining the disclosure of IP addresses
via the WebRTC API. In this study, Safari did not allow any client IP addresses to be
leaked via WebRTC. Edge, on the other hand, proved to be the most privacy-damaging
in this respect. However, regardless of the user browser choice, we found that some
VPN implementations prevent leaking of client public IP address(es). Moreover, in some
cases, selecting an appropriate client VPN configuration fully or partially prevented
disclosure of IP addresses via WebRTC. The experiments we performed in this study
explored an aspect of WebRTC leaks that has not been addressed in previous work,
namely that the choice of browser and VPN service can make a significant difference
to the number of IP addresses that are leaked. The results will help users decide on
best practices to minimize the risk of loss of IP confidentiality. We also hope it will
encourage VPN and browser providers to work on mitigating the privacy-compromising
properties of their implementations of the WebRTC API.
In Chapter 6, we described FingerprintAlert, a freely available browser extension
that detects, and optionally blocks, transfers of data likely to be used for browser
fingerprinting. It also provides users with detailed reports of detected fingerprinting.
Whilst it is not 100% accurate, the main purpose of developing the extension was to
make browser users aware of the wide use of browser fingerprinting and to enable them
to exert some control over it.
In Chapter 7 we discussed how browser fingerprinting is becoming commonplace,
with browsers leaving users unequipped with the means to control it. This is likely
to damage online privacy. This privacy risk is particularly serious since third-party
countermeasures are inherently limited. In the chapter we reviewed and analysed a
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wide range of measures that can be performed by browser vendors to help address this
problem. We also propose a new browser identifier that would serve as a standardized
and controllable method for online tracking.
8.2 Future Work
In Chapter 3 we described a study aimed at learning how many of the 10,000 most
visited websites are performing browser fingerprinting. In this study, detection was
based on identifying the presence of one or more of 17 specific attribute values in HTTP
messages sent by the browser. No doubt it would be useful for future studies of this
type to include a larger number of attributes. Moreover, increasing the number of the
crawled websites would also be valuable; indeed ideally we should try to examine all
the active websites on the web.
As discussed in 4.2.4, the unique device IDs that are assigned to video/audio devices
(e.g. microphones or loudspeakers), and that are revealed by the WebRTC API, are
potentially a rich source of information for fingerprinting. This is particularly so if they
remain unchanged for long periods of time, as is the case for some browsers. Despite the
privacy risk they pose, to the author’s knowledge, no study has evaluated their potential
role in fingerprinting. Moreover, the privacy risk posed by these IDs would be increased
if the current ID for a device could somehow be linked to previous IDs. Clearly, further
studies are needed to better understand these device IDs, their potential usefulness in
fingerprinting, and the reason for the varying implementations by browsers.
In the near future we aim to improve FingerprintAlert by increasing the number
of automatically-detectable attributes. This can be achieved by further in-depth
examination of the formats and values of attributes that are currently undetectable.
Since the crawler used to perform the experiments described in Chapter 3 is based on the
extension, any future crawls would also be made more effective by such improvements.
For example, the device ID values discussed in Chapter 4 could be included as a new
detectable attribute. However, the usefulness of including such an attribute depends on
it remaining unchanged for long enough to be useful in fingerprinting and tracking.
If it is to be pursued further, the UBI proposed in 7.5 would require a detailed
analysis of its possible implementation and use, as well as its impact on user privacy
both from an ethical and a legal/regulatory perspective. To have any chance of it being
adopted as a possible standard feature for inclusion in browsers, it would be necessary
to get wider agreement that such an approach is desirable. That is, promoting an open
debate on such an issue, e.g. through conference presentations and panel discussions,
would appear to be the logical next step.
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Appendices
This thesis concludes with a series of appendices containing supplementary information
about the experiments described in Chapters 3, 4 and 5.
Appendix A gives details of the websites identified as performing fingerprinting in
the crawl of 10,000 websites (described in Chapter 3).
Appendix B lists the Python script that was used to control the crawler discussed
in Chapter 3.
Appendix C lists the 286 fingerprintable browser attributes (divided into six cate-
gories) that were discovered in the data collected in the experiment described in Chapter
3.
Appendix D lists the sources of the code used on the fingerprintable website as well
as the HTML source code of the fingerprintability test page. This test page was used
for the experiments described in Chapter 4.
Appendix E lists the specifications and versions of operating systems, browsers and
devices used in the experiments described in Chapter 4.
Appendix F lists the sources of the code as well as the code used on https://
fingerprintable.org/webrtcleaks for the experiments described in Chapter 5.
I
A Results of Crawling Experiment
A.1 Major Fingerprinters
Table 1 lists the fingerprinter domains that were present on at least 100 of the 10,000
websites tested as part of the experiment described in Chapter 3.
Table 1: Fingerprinters present on at least 100 websites
























A.2 Suspected Fingerprinter Domains
Listed below are all 1,914 domains that were recipients of detected browser fingerprinting






































































































































































































































































































































































Below is the Python script used to control the crawling process discussed in Chapter 3.
import argparse




from selenium import webdriver
from selenium.webdriver.chrome.options import Options













for i, line in enumerate(open("top_10000_websites.txt", "r")):
url = line.strip()
if i < start:
continue
if i > end:
logger.debug("Stopped at {0} website".format(i))
os.system(
"say ’For hes a jolly good fellow for hes a jolly good fellow! For hes
↪→ a jolly good fellow which nobody can deny!’")
getConsent = input("Done!")
if getConsent.lower() == "go":
stop = True







except TimeoutException as e:
logger.debug(e)
timeout_list.append(url)
with open("timeout_websites.txt", "a") as f:
for website in timeout_list:
f.write(website + "\n")
logger.debug("Stopped at {0} website".format(i))
os.system(
"say ’Its me the crawler! Please restart at {0}’".format(i))
os.system("say ’you know what to do’")
getConsent = input("Do you want to stop the crawler, Yes or no? ")
if getConsent.lower() == "yes":
stop = True




























parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(usage="python3 auto.py -s <number of
↪→ websites to start> -e <number of websites to end>",
description=’Extract main contents from a video file!!’)
parser.add_argument("-s", "--start", type=int, dest="start",
help="the n websites to start!")
parser.add_argument("-e", "--end", type=int, dest="end",





if __name__ == ’__main__’:
main()
XV
C Attributes Collected by Fingerprinters
This appendix lists all the fingerprintable browser attributes (divided into six categories)
we were able to detect in the experiment described in Chapter 3.
C.1 WebGL
















































































The attributes listed here are of various types and do not belong to any of the categories








D Fingerprinting Test Code
The scripts executed by our fingerprintable website and used to perform the experiments
described in Chapter 4 were gathered from the following websites.
• Most scripts were obtained from https://clientjs.org
• The script used to detect WebGL features was obtained from https://github.
com/spleennooname/GLeye
• The script used to detect WebRTC features was obtained from https://github.
com/muaz-khan/DetectRTC
Some scripts were modified to suit our testing. All the code we used for testing
is available at our website https://fingerprintable.org. The source code of the
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E Browser Versions, OS Versions and Device Specifica-
tions
E.1 Browser and OS Versions
Table 2 lists operating systems and browsers that were tested in the experiments
described in Chapter 4.
Table 2: Browser and OS Details
Browser OS
Desktop
Chrome 56.0.2924.87 (64-bit) Windows 10.0.15063 Build 15063
Microsoft Internet Explorer 11.576.14393.0 Windows 10.0.15063 Build 15063
Firefox 51.2 (32-bit) Windows 10.0.15063 Build 15063
Microsoft Edge 38.14393.0.0 Windows 10.0.15063 Build 15063
Safari 10.0.3 (12602.4.8) macOS Sierra 10.12.3
Mobile
Chrome 56.0.2924.87 Android 7.0 (Build 39.2.A.0.374)
Safari 602.1 iOS 10.2.1(14d27)
Opera Mini 22.0.2254.113472 Android 7.0 (Build 39.2.A.0.374)
Firefox 51.0.3 Android 7.0 (Build 39.2.A.0.374)
Microsoft Edge 38.14393.693.0 Windows 10 Mobile (Build: 10.0.14393.693)
E.2 Summary
Table 3 provides a summary of the specifications of the four desktop and five mobile
devices used in the experiments described in Chapter 4.
Table 3: Specifications of devices used for experiments
Device CPU GPU
Desktop
Asus (Windows) Intel Core i7-4720HQ 2.6GHz NVIDIA GeForce GTX 960M
HP (Windows) Intel Core i5-5200U 2.2GHz Intel HD Graphics 5500
Macbook (macOS) Intel Core i5 2.7GHz Intel Iris Graphics 6100
Macbook (macOS) Intel Core i7 2.7GHz Intel HD Graphics 530
Mobile
Sony (Android) Qualcomm Snapdragon 820 64-bit Adreno 530
Samsung (Android) Qualcomm Snapdragon 801 2.5GHz Adreno 330
iPhone(iOS) A8 chip 64-bit PowerVR GX6450
iPhone (iOS) A10 chip 64-bit PowerVR Series7XT Plus
Microsoft (Windows) Qualcomm Snapdragon 400 1.2GHz Adreno 305
Microsoft (Windows) Qualcomm Snapdragon 200 1.2GHz Adreno 302
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E.3 Details
Detailed specifications of the four desktop and five mobile devices used in the experiments
described in Chapter 4 are given below.
Desktop
Windows computer 1
OS: Microsoft Windows 10.0.15063 Build 15063
System Manufacturer: ASUSTeK COMPUTER INC.
System Model: G551JW
CPU: Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-4720HQ CPU @ 2.60GHz, 2594 Mhz, 4 Core(s)
GPU: NVIDIA GeForce GTX 960M
RAM: 16.0 GB
Storage: HDD 1.0 TB
Windows computer 2
OS: Microsoft Windows 10.0.15063 Build 15063
System Manufacturer: HP
System Model: HP Pavilion Notebook
CPU: Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-5200U CPU @ 2.20GHz, 2195 Mhz, 2 Core(s)
GPU: Intel(R) HD Graphics 5500
RAM: 12.0 GB
Storage: HDD 1.0 TB
Mac computer 1
OS: macOS Sierra (version 10.12.3)
System Manufacturer: Apple Inc.
System Model: MacBookPro12,1
CPU: Intel Core i5 2.7GHz
GPU: Intel Iris Graphics 6100 1536 MB
RAM: 8.0 GB
Storage: SSD 256 GB
Mac computer 2
OS: macOS Sierra (version 10.12.3)
System Manufacturer: Apple Inc.
System Model: MacBookPro13,3
CPU: Intel Core i7 2.7GHz
XXI
GPU: Intel HD Graphics 530
RAM: 16.0 GB
Storage: SSD 256 GB
Mobile
Android phone 1
OS: Android 7.0 (build 39.2.A.0.374)
System Manufacturer: Sony Mobile Communications Inc.
System Model: Sony Xperia XZ (F8332)
CPU: Qualcomm R© SnapdragonTM 820, 64-bit processor
GPU: Adreno 530
RAM: 3.0 GB
Storage: SD 64.0 GB
Android phone 2
OS: Android 6.0.1 (build 23.5.A.1.291)
System Manufacturer: Sony Mobile Communications Inc.
System Model: Sony Xperia Z3 (D6633)
CPU: Qualcomm Snapdragon 801 2.5 GHz Quad-core
GPU: Adreno 330 (component of CPU)
RAM: 3.0 GB
Storage: SD 16.0 GB
iPhone 1
OS: iOS 10.2.1 (14d27)
System Manufacturer: Apple Inc.
System Model: iPhone 6 Plus (A1524)
CPU: A8 chip with 64-bit architecture
GPU: PowerVR GX6450
RAM: 1.0 GB
Storage: SD 32.0 GB
iPhone 2
OS: iOS 10.2.1 (14d27)
System Manufacturer: Apple Inc.
System Model: iPhone 7 Plus (A1784)
XXII
CPU: A10 chip with 64-bit architecture
GPU: PowerVR Series7XT Plus
RAM: 3.0 GB
Storage: SD 128.0 GB
Windows phone 1
OS: Windows 10.0.14393.0 (32-bit)
System Manufacturer: Microsoft
System Model: Microsoft Lumia 640 XL
CPU: Qualcomm Snapdragon 400 1.2GHz
GPU: Adreno 305
RAM: 1.0 GB
Storage: SD 8.0 GB
Windows phone 2
OS: Windows 8.1 6.3.9600 (32-bit)
System Manufacturer: Microsoft
System Model: Microsoft Lumia 435
CPU: Qualcomm Snapdragon 200 1.2GHz
GPU: Adreno 302
RAM: 1.0 GB
Storage: SD 8.0 GB
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F WebRTC Leaks Test Code
The script used on https://fingerprintable.org/webrtcleaks for the experiments
described in Chapter 5, was obtained from https://github.com/diafygi/webrtc-ips
and https://browserleaks.com/webrtc. The script was used to discover client IP








↪→ }catch(a){return void e()}g.onicecandidate=function(a){a.candidate&&b(a.
↪→ candidate.candidate)},g.createDataChannel(""),g.createOffer(function(a)
↪→ {g.setLocalDescription(a,function(){},function(){})},function(){}),
↪→ setTimeout(function(){var a=g.localDescription.sdp.split("\n");a.
↪→ forEach(function(a){0===a.indexOf("a=candidate:")&&b(a)})},1e3)}
function b(a,b,c)
{return a+(c?"</a>":"")+"&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;"}
function d(a)
{g=a.match(/^(192\.168\.|169\.254\.|10\.|172\.(1[6-9]|2\d|3[01]))/)?"#local_ip
↪→ ":a.match(/^[a-f0-9]{1,4}(:[a-f0-9]{1,4}){7}$/)?"#ipv6":"n/a","n/a"==$(
↪→ g).text()&&($(g).empty(),$(g).parent().removeClass("none")),"#local_ip
↪→ "==g?$(g).append(b(a,"_local",!1)):"#ipv6"==g&&$(g).append(b(a,"x",!1))
↪→ }
function e()
{if(window.RTCIceGatherer)try
{var a=new RTCIceGatherer({gatherPolicy:"all",iceServers:[{urls:Array.from("
↪→ turn:numb.viagenie.ca:3478?transport=udp").join(""),username:Array.from
↪→ ("admin@fingerprintable.org").join(""),credential:Array.from("007").
↪→ join("")}]}),b={};a.onlocalcandidate=function(a)
{setTimeout(function()
{if(a.candidate.ip&&"relay"!=a.candidate.type){var c
↪→ =/([0-9]{1,3}(\.[0-9]{1,3}){3}|[a-f0-9]{1,4}(:[a-f0-9]{1,4}){7})/.exec(
↪→ a.candidate.ip)[1];void 0===b[c]&&d(c),b[c]=!0}
},300)}}
catch(a){}
/*alert(a);*/}
var g;a(function(a){d(a)});}();
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